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When contracting officers procure goods and services to meet the needs of government 
agencies and programs, they seek best value and manage risk. Those government 
agencies must comply with fiscal laws while fulfilling their needs. Fiscal laws and 
regulations were originally designed for peacetime environments, processes, and systems. 
When unforeseen events occur and require an immediate response—such as a 
contingency environment mission—the regulatory framework is stressed. In a 
contingency environment, the constraints of fiscal laws and Federal Acquisition 
Regulations (FAR) put contracting officers in the position of compromising mission 
results or compliance with the rules. This study examines cases where fiscal law 
constraints lead to either violation of the Anti Deficiency Act or impact to missions. We 
find that different contingency environments and phases of the contingency present 
different risks to mission effectiveness and compliance. We provide recommendations for 
more flexible funding and regulatory models in contingency environments. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an overview of the layout 
of our report. In Section A, we identify the problem and purpose of our research. In 
Section B, we present the significance of researching the implications and constraints of 
fiscal law in contingency environments. In Section C, we provide the roadmap of our 
methodology and the organization of our report.   
A. PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND PURPOSE 
The Department of Defense (DoD) acquires goods, services, and construction to 
support military operations through contracting. This is a routine function within the DoD 
and is controlled by fiscal laws and contracting regulations. These laws originated in 
peacetime environments. The philosophy of fiscal law as stated in United States v. 
MacCollom (1976), “The established rule is that the expenditure of public funds is proper 
only when authorized by Congress, not that public funds may be expended unless 
prohibited by Congress.”  The U.S. government agencies and the military must comply 
with fiscal law statutes when fulfilling the needs of agencies and programs authorized by 
Congress. Government contracting officers, guided by Federal Acquisition Regulations, 
obligate authorized and appropriated funds. The contracting officers’ primary goal is to 
acquire the services and supplies needed by “the warfighter to support essential missions 
in response to a crisis, contingency, or declaration of war” (Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy [DPAP], 2012, Chapter 2). Meeting the needs of the Government 
through procurement of goods and services provides for the best value and best price and 
by managing acquisition risks. Originally, designed fiscal laws and regulations apply in 
peacetime environments, processes, and systems. Wartime contracting brings unique 
funding challenges. 
Not all contracting situations and environments occur in peacetime or are routine, 
however. When unforeseen events occur, the acquisition of goods, services, and 
construction requires the contracting professional to be responsive, innovative, and 
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efficient in providing procurement solutions to support the contingency environment. 
These environments include not only declarations of war but also facilitating the defense 
of the nation against or recovering from nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological 
attack as well as situations where the President issues an emergency declaration or major 
disaster declaration. Recent emergencies and major disasters have included operations in 
New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and in New York after storm damage 
in 2012. The military has also supported disasters in other countries, such as the operation 
in support of Haiti after the January 2010 earthquake. Contingency operations generate 
the initial needs purchasing basic life-support necessities such as water, food, billeting, 
ammunition, communication devices, and transportation. 
When working in a contingency environment, acquisition teams are required to 
follow rules, regulations, and laws throughout the requirements generation and the 
acquisition processes in the same manner as acquisitions to support any other military 
operation.   
While defense military capabilities have made substantial strides in countering 
ongoing threats—for example, drone warfare and software integration into weapon 
systems—the laws and regulations for funding military operations in contingency 
environments have changed minimally. The Commission on Wartime Contracting 
(CWC) reported, “Fiscal concerns also complicate the success of ongoing and future 
contingency contracting” (Commission on Wartime Contracting [CWC], 2011, p. 29). 
The Commission estimated that by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2011, hundreds of billions 
of dollars would be obligated under contingency contracts. Actual expenditures could be 
even higher than estimated because not all contracts that support contingency operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan are identifiable as such (CWC, 2011, p. 22). 
The risk of violating these rules increases in a contingency environment because 
of the high demands and requirements involved in contingency operations, including 
urgent needs in remote or disaster locations. It is a problem when contracting 
professionals are unable to meet the needs for the military in these intense situations. This 
study focuses on the intersection of (1) federal funding rules designed for a routine 
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environment and (2) the task of citing those funds on contingency contracts to uncover 
the challenges placed on decision-makers in contingency environments.   
As contracting professionals working in a command that supports contingency 
contracting missions, such as the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) and 
Reachback, we have recognized the challenges faced by decision-makers in the field 
associated with supporting the warfighter. LOGCAP is an initiative by the United States 
Army to pre-plan—during peacetime—for the use of civilian contractors to perform 
selected services in wartime and other contingencies to augment United States forces in 
support of DoD missions (LOGCAP, 2013).  
LOGCAP’s primary focus is to provide support to and improve the operational 
strength of U.S. Army forces. LOGCAP can also provide support to other U.S. military 
Services, coalition and multinational forces, and other Government and non-Government 
agency components in support of joint, combined, coalition, and multinational operations. 
These operations include missions other than war, such as training, peacekeeping, or 
humanitarian assistance missions.    
The Reachback contracting mission supports the U.S. Forces Southwest Asia to 
conduct larger complex contracting functions utilizing experienced work force located in 
the continental United States (CONUS). These resources include the Financial Services 
Division, Contracting Policy, Property Expertise, and the Army Sustainment Command’s 
Counsel.  
The Reachback Division’s service and supply acquisitions focus on logistics, 
warehousing, transportation, stevedoring and related terminal logistics, base operations, 
and security, intelligence, counterinsurgency, and telecommunications requirements.   
Examples of problems we experienced that motivated this research include the 
following: 
• Seemingly, unlimited funding for contingencies through supplemental 
appropriations may have the unintended consequence of postponing and 
prioritizing program requirements. The supplemental budget may also 
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obscure the full cost of contracting and create the illusion that contractors 
in the war zone are a free resource. 
• Fiscal law constrains the efficiency of contingency contracting specifically 
associated with military construction (MILCON). Personnel in the field, 
who are otherwise struggling to keep pace with the changing requirements 
under urgent conditions, are required to understand the definitions of 
MILCON and separate and track MILCON expenditures to avoid Anti-
Deficiency Act (ADA) violations. 
• Fiscal law limits the use of certain funds for specific circumstances. 
Personnel in the field are required to thoroughly understand the 
requirements and properly cite the correct type of funds. Strong 
knowledge of the requirement is particularly evident when operation and 
maintenance (O&M) funding is for unspecified minor construction, and 
repairs and maintenance.   
• In some instances, LOGCAP contracts apply funding incrementally based 
on historical burn rates as compared to forecasted needs. The use of burn 
rates makes the tracking and reporting of funds for the initial contract 
award, undefinitized change orders, and the calculation of fees on 
definitized task orders difficult.   
• The lack of Other Procurement Army (OPA) funding forces contractors to 
lease equipment when buying would be more appropriate because the 
lease adds risk for possible loss or damage. Procurement fiscal law 
constraints dictate leasing and preclude potentially more efficient purchase 
options.   
The purpose of this paper is to identify and analyze the constraints that the 
existing fiscal laws and regulations place on the process of contracting for goods and 




influence missions. The study also attempts to determine whether there is a pattern to the 
fiscal law constraints and effects through the examination of contingency environment 
cases.  
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research is important to inform readers of substantial unintended 
consequences, which may include loss of position or advancements, incarceration, and/or   
monetary damages, in the contingency contracting process from a rigid set of regulations. 
The large amounts of contracted dollars involved in contingency contracts are in the 
billions of dollars. The results of the research could support changes to fiscal laws that 
would minimize the burdens on contracting professionals, minimize the risk of violating 
rules, but most importantly improve support to warfighters.  
C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
Chapter II is a Literature Review that begins with foundational concepts. In the 
chapter, we first cover the various types of contingency environments, since fiscal law 
may have different impacts in each type of environment. We cover the processes to 
obtain funding for a specific good or service and the basic fiscal law framework for the 
various types of funding. We also describe contingency contracting.  
In Chapter III, we review the Government investigations relating to contingency 
contracting findings and recommendations to analyze the unique funding challenges of 
contingency contracting and fiscal law impacts.   
In Chapter IV, we examine ADA cases related to contingency contracting or in a 
contingency environment reported to Congress through the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) from 2007 through 2012. We also analyze specific scenarios of 
contingency contracting where there is a high potential for either a violation of fiscal law 
or a negative impact on the mission. The cases examined include the following: 
• military construction and severable funding, 
• temporary military construction, 
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• life, health, and safety funding,  
• lease versus buy procurements, and 
• LOGCAP work orders. 
In analyzing the cases, we seek patterns among the types of fiscal law constraints 
and contingency environments in order to craft policy recommendations, which appear in 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, we describe the terms used throughout this study so the reader has 
a clear understanding. We cover the concepts of contingencies, contracting, 
appropriations, basic fiscal law, and types of fund currently available. 
A. CONTINGENCY 
1. Definitions 
The dictionary definition of contingency is an event that is “not certain to occur,” 
“something liable to happen as an adjunct to or result of else,” “happening by chance or 
unforeseen causes” (“Contingency,” n.d.). Business leaders and strategists try to prepare 
for contingencies or another plan to put into place that may affect desired outcomes.   
According to 10 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) § 101(13) (A), Organization and General 
Military Powers, Definitions, a “contingency operation” is a military operation formally 
designated by the Secretary of Defense in which member of the armed forces engaged in 
military actions against enemy or opposing military forces. Subsection (B) also provides 
the President and Congress the authority to declare contingencies in response to war or 
natural disasters in which military personnel mobilize to provide assistance.  
The Government has put into place contingency operations should these 
unforeseen circumstances take place. The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 2.101 
(2012) definition for contingency operation is as follows: 
Contingency operation (10 U.S.C. 101(a)(13)) means a military operation 
that (1) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which 
members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military 
actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or 
against an opposing military force; or (2) results in a call or order to, or 
retention on, active duty of members of the united services under section 
688, 1201(a), 21302, 12304, 12305, or 12406 of 10 U.S.C., chapter 15 of 
10 U.S.C., or any other provision of law during a war or during a national 
emergency declared by the President or Congress.    
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The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense revised the definition to provide for 
treatment as a contingency operation when the Secretary of Defense activates reserves in 
response to a governor’s request for federal assistance (DFARS Class Deviation 2013-
O0003, 2013). This revision has extended the contracting officers’ authority to use the 
emergency acquisition authorities in specifically identified emergency areas provided in 
FAR 18.2 (2012), in Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 
218.2 (2012), and in the definition of simplified acquisition threshold at FAR 2.101 
(2012).  
Gansler’s 2010 briefing defined the following: 
• Immediate: goal is 120 days to field; 
• Urgent: goal is fewer than 12 months to field; 
• Rapid: goal is one to three years to field; 
• Enduring: three or more years to field; and 
• Contingency: immediate need filled in theater.  
Different Services also use different terminology for identification of these 
Urgent/Rapid needs (Gansler, 2010): 
• Army -Operational Need Statement (ONS) 
• AF and Navy -Urgent Operational Need Statement (UONS) 
• United States Marine Corp (USMC) -Urgent Universal Need Statement 
(UUNS) 
• Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement (JUONS) 
• Combat-Mission Need Statement, Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM) 
• Immediate Warfare Need 
• Integrated Priority List 
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Defining contingency and related terms is important when working in different 
types of contingency environments, whether war related or disaster related. The 
establishment of the anticipated schedule for the effort can be difficult when defining the 
requirements and determination of the type of funds that are available. In this study, we 
review approaches taken when two branches attempt to work together to design a 
requirement, identify terms and funding can put undue stress on the requirement 
generators, and may result in delays and cancellation of the project. 
2. Types 
Contingency contracting consists of five main types of operations. Determining 
the type of contingency involved is important because the contingency type influences 
the maturity of the operational environment for which contracting support is used. The 
analysis of the operational environment’s maturity is important in our research because 
the time constraints of fiscal laws in the contingency environment involve the use of 
O&M funding over long periods of time (DPAP, 2012). 
A sophisticated infrastructure capable of supporting and sustaining operations for 
extensive periods is a mature environment. A mature environment can have all or a 
combination of the following characteristics: legal framework, host-nation agreements, 
and financial networks to support complex transactions, vigorous transportation systems, 
business capacity, capability, and a willingness to interact (DPAP, 2012). 
A mature environment has the ability to adapt quickly to changing requirements 
and priorities. It often consists of vendors and suppliers that have prior contracting 
experience with the U.S. government and that can comply with FAR requirements. 
An immature contracting environment is one that lacks the support infrastructure 
detailed previously. Few, if any, vendors may be available with which to conduct 
business, and they likely have had no previous experience working with the U.S. 
government (Barbaris & Callanan, 2008). 
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a. Major Theater War 
In a major theater war, hostilities are ongoing, imminent, or likely, and 
involve a substantial commitment of United States military forces. Entire military force 
structures engage in conflicts with a specific geographic area (for example, Operation 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan).   
b. Smaller Scale Contingencies 
Similar to a major theater war, a smaller scale contingency operation is 
generally held in a specific area of operation, but the threat is less compelling, resulting 
in a smaller number of United States forces and a restricted time schedule (for example, 
Operation Just Cause in Panama). 
c. Military Operations Other than War 
Military operations other than war (MOOTW) focus on the prevention of 
war, including conflict resolution, promotion of peace, and supporting civil or domestic 
crises. U.S. forces support can involve combat and noncombat operations. A recent 
military deployment as a MOOTW is the 2011 military intervention in Libya whereby the 
United Nations authorized no-fly zone enforcement in defense of rebel factions in Libya.   
d. Domestic Disaster and Emergency Relief Operations 
Domestic disaster and emergency relief operations focus on natural 
disasters such as hurricanes, weather storms, earthquakes, and floods and are supported 
by U.S. military forces providing clean-up and humanitarian assistance (for example, 
after Hurricanes Hugo, Andrew, and Katrina and, most recently, Hurricane Sandy in the 
northeastern U.S). These operations also include man-made disasters resulting from oil 
spills, riots, and air, rail, or highway accidents.  (For example, the Coast Guard supported 
the British Petroleum [BP] Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010.)  The United States has 
been instrumental in supporting domestic disaster and emergency relief operations in 
both CONUS and Outside of Contiguous United States (OCONUS), providing cleanup 
and humanitarian assistance. 
 11 
e. Military Exercises 
Military exercises prepare the military for contingency including the 
“sense of urgency, pressure, or risk to life or national interest” (DPAP, 2012). These 
exercises do not receive special consideration for forms of relief with specific contract 
actions or funding, as they do not qualify as declared contingencies or as a major 
contingency type. Examples of military exercises include Joint Dawn, Key Resolve, and 
the National Training Center rotation (DPAP, 2012). 
3. Phases 
While no two contingency contracting operations are exactly alike, they fall into 
one or more of the four typical phases of a contingency operation (Air Force Logistics 
Management Agency, 2008):  
• Phase I–Mobilization/Initial Deployment  
• Phase II–Buildup  
• Phase III–Sustainment  
• Phase IV–Termination/Redeployment  
It is important for contingency contracting officers (CCOs) to understand what 
phase of a contingency an operation falls within, because this classification can assist 
them in assessing their resources and preparing for the requirements needed to fulfill 
mission support. Not all operations follow the particular sequence detailed as follows. 
The operational theater can be in a hybrid phase based on various factors, including, but 
not limited to, operational environment, mission adjustments, and personnel surges. 
a. Phase I: Mobilization/Initial Deployment 
The first phase of a contingency operation occurs in the first 30–45 days 
of a mission. A CCO may perform different roles in rapid sequence, such as initial 
requestor, approving official, certifying officer, lodging officer, logistics coordinator, 
transportation officer, inspector, supply/inventory manager, and property administrator, 
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among other things. The need to award contracts quickly upon arrival is usually 
imperative to the mission. The highest priority for contracting professionals during this 
stage is to be responsive to providing basic life-support requirements, security services, 
and support for the arrival of the initial ground troops. These items can include food, 
water, shelter, utilities, transportation, fuel, sanitation, interpreters, and guides. 
b. Phase II: Buildup 
The buildup phase of a contingency operation, normally day 45 and 
forward, is generally a continuation of the initial deployment phase. Troops and 
contracting personnel supporting the mission deploy. The focus continues to be basic life 
support and security requirements. More attention applies towards the acquisition of 
construction material, heavy equipment, quality-of-life items, and office equipment. The 
establishment of a contracting office with a solid and reliable vendor base is a key 
priority in this phase. 
c. Phase III: Sustainment 
The sustainment phase of a contingency operation runs from the end of the 
buildup stage through the point that redeployment begins. Focus increases on providing 
permanent facilities and equipment, office supplies, and discretionary services. The main 
priority of a CCO and his or her support team is establishing long-term, Indefinite 
Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contracts and Blanket Purchase Agreements that 
consolidate requirements—thus benefiting from economies of scale and reducing costs. 
Developing internal controls, minimizing waste and abuse, increasing competition among 
its vendor base, and transitioning the workload for the next round of contracting 
personnel or termination and redeployment is emphasized during the sustainment phase.  
d. Phase IV: Termination/Redeployment 
During the last phase, the urgency transfers to preparing for troop 
deployments to home or other areas of an operation. The CCO continues to focus on life-
support contracts throughout the duration of the mission. New requirements may include 
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packing and freight services, the transportation of troops, and the preparation of material 
and equipment for transfer (DPAP, 2012). 
 Contracting personnel are required to terminate or close out existing contracts 
and orders. This includes ensuring final payment to contractors and closing any open 
issues associated with their contracts. The CCO may transfer the files to an organization 
such as the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), or the CCO may be 
responsible for storing or destroying the files themselves, as appropriate. 
B. DEFINITIONS 
1. Contracting 
The FAR (2013) defines acquisition as “acquiring by contracting with 
appropriated funds of supplies or services (including construction) by and for the use of 
the federal government through purchase or lease…”  It is important to understand that 
the federal regulation notes that appropriated funds are required in order to contract for 
supplies or services. The government or the contractor may lease or purchase within 
terms of the contract (FAR 52.245–1(a), 2013). As part of our study, we review the 
acquisition process problems involving purchases and leases of supplies and services.   
Within the FAR (2013) definition of contract, a contract includes all types of 
instruments that obligate the government to an expenditure of appropriated funds and 
that, except as otherwise authorized, are in writing. Again, the FAR emphasizes that 
requirement of the use of appropriated funds for the acquisition of goods and/or services 
(FAR Part 2.01, 2012).     
The National Emergencies Act enacted in 1976, provides for certain procedures 
granting the President’s authority to declare a national emergency is “with respect to Acts 
of Congress authorizing the exercise, during the period of a national emergency, of any 
special or extraordinary power” (50 U.S.C. § 1621(A), 2012). The FAR (2012) definition 
of contingency contracting refers to a national emergency declared by the President 
which sets the stage for contracting in a contingency environment.     
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The Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook states that “contingency 
contracting encompasses all contracting performed in a contingency environment 
(declared and non-declared), including military operations, stability operations, natural 
disasters, and other calamitous events” (DPAP, 2012, Chapter 4). 
The DAU defines contingency contracting as “direct contracting support to 
tactical and operational forces engaged in the full spectrum of armed conflict and 
MOOTW, both domestic and overseas” (DPAP, 2012). 
U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Publication 1–06, Money as a Weapon 
System–Afghanistan (MAAWS-A; USFOR-A, 2012), describes Contingency Construction 
Authority (CCA) while describing the use of O&M  funds on projects that meet specific 
requirements and states: 
Construction is necessary to meet urgent military operational requirements 
of a temporary nature involving the use of the Armed Forces in support of 
a declaration of war, the declaration by the President of a national 
emergency under Section 201 of the National Emergencies Act, or a 
contingency operation.  (p. 42) 
2. Sustainment 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines sustain as “to give support or relief to” 
and “to supply with sustenance” (“Sustain,” 2013). Previously, we described sustainment 
as Phase III of contingency contracting. The contracting activity expands into contracts 
for enhanced quality of life and facilities that are more permanent and equipment, in 
alignment with the preceding dictionary definition “supply with sustenance.”  Established 
procedures exist through the Army & Air Force Exchange Service, Navy Exchange 
Service, or the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to acquire local merchandise not 
available in the area of responsibility (AOR). The Army Sustainment Command’s 
mission “Links National logistics capabilities, executes materiel distribution, and provides 
logistics solutions to enable unit readiness” (U.S. Army, 2013). Its assignment is to 
improve logistics support to troops on the battlefield (U.S. Army, 2013). 
Contingency contracting performed during peacekeeping operations, combat 
operations, and post-conflict operations is a stable operation (DPAP, 2013, Chapter 4). 
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To ensure joint military and cross-Service coordination requires oversight. This can be a 
tremendous challenge if the requirement involves more than one military department, 
such as a Joint Force Command requirement major reconstruction-relating contracting 
effort (DPAP, 2013, Chapter 4).   
The Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3000.05, Stability operations, 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2009) defines stability operations as “encompassing 
various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in 
coordination with other instrument of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and 
secure environment, provide essential Governmental services, emergency infrastructure 
reconstruction, and humanitarian relief” (p. 1). 
FAR 2.01 (2012) defines the term sustainable acquisition as “acquiring goods and 
services in order to create and maintain conditions (1) Under which humans and nature 
can exist in product harmony; and (2) That permit fulfilling the social, economic, and 
other requirements of present and future generations.”  
Table 1 reflects the instances of the use of U.S. Armed Forces abroad between the 
years 1962–2011. The importance of this table is to reflect on the length of time U.S. 
forces deployment overseas. Many of these longer deployments have longer sustainment 
periods, which require different approaches to use of funds. 
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Table 1.   U.S. Forces Abroad, 1962–2011 
 
(Source:  Commission analysis of CRS Report R41677, “Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces 
Abroad, 1798–2010,” March 10, 2011) 
 
The importance of understanding sustainment and sustainment acquisition is that 
in a contingency environment, it is the third phase whereby acquisition missions are to 
improve upon the current conditions, create, and maintain new conditions. We examine 
problems faced in contingency environments are examined; the constraints of fiscal laws 
and the stage of contingency environment are analyzed to determine what problem(s) 
may or may not occur.    
3. Acquisition Regulations  
a. Federal and Agency Regulations 
The FAR and additional regulations guide acquisition personnel 
depending on the DoD branch, agency, and programs Links to these regulations are 
available in Table 2.   
Table 2 is included to present the various acquisition regulations followed. 
The branch of Service determines the application of the regulation that the contract is 
supporting and the hierarchy followed.   
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Table 2.   Federal Acquisition Regulations 
   FAR     DFARS    AFARS   
   DARS     DLAD    NMCARS     AFFARS 
  USTRANSCOM     AGAR     AIDAR     CAR  
   DEARS     DIARS     DOLAR     DOSAR  
   DTAR     EDAR     EPAAR     FEHBAR  
   GSAM     HHSAR     HSAR     HUDAR  
   IAAR     JAR     LIFAR     NFS  
   NRCAR     TAR     VAAR    USSOCOM  
 
For the purposes of our research, this paper focuses on the FAR, the 
DFARS, and the Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS). Members 
of the acquisition team use the FAR, which outlines procurement policies and procedures. 
If a policy or procedure, or a particular strategy or practice, is in the best interest of the 
government and is not specifically addressed in the neither FAR nor prohibited by a law 
(statute or case law), Executive Order, or other regulation, government members of the 
team do not assume that it is prohibited. Rather, the team may innovate and use sound 
business judgment that is otherwise consistent with the law and within the limits of their 
authority in an absence of fiscal regulatory or legal direction. Contracting officers take 
the lead in encouraging business process innovations and ensuring that business decisions 
are sound (FAR 102–4(e), 2012). We will also show where conflicts can occur when two 
military branches are involved in a project and the regulations differ.   
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b. DoD: DoD Financial Management Regulation 
DoD 7000.14-R, DoD Financial Management Regulation (FMR) issued 
under the authority of DoDI 7000.14, DoD Financial Management Policy and Procedures 
(U.S. Department of Defense, 2012). The publication provides statutory and regulatory 
financial management requirements, systems, and functions for all appropriated and non-
appropriated DoD component-funding activities. Since contracts cite federal 
appropriations to pay for the goods and services, the statement of work on the contract 
must be consistent with the source of funding. 
c. USFOR Publication 1–06: Money As a Weapon System–
Afghanistan 
The contingency contracting and funding process for the current war in 
Afghanistan is also regulated by the Army publication Money As a Weapon System–
Afghanistan (MAAWS–A), USFOR-A Publication 1–06 (USFOR-A, 2012). The book 
provides warfighters with procedures for developing the proper documentation for 
procurement in the AOR.   
Appendix A shows the basic procedures of the Four-Step Planning 
Process. The procedures indicate the optimal timeframe to process a requirement. 
Timeframes presented are more the exception than the norm. In this study, we examine 
the strains placed on the contracting commands using this process as well as the delays 
involved in obtaining funding for the needs of the warfighter. 
4. Authorizations and Appropriations for Defense 
The DoD exercises budget authority, which is the legal authority under an 
appropriation act to bind the government to make a payment from the Treasury. This 
budget authority allows the DoD to acquire good and services, build military facilities, 
and pay the military personnel and other outlays from the Treasury. Through 




a binding agreement called obligations. An obligation is a legal reservation of funds in 
the Treasury. Upon execution of the contract terms, the U.S. Treasury makes the 
payment. 
Most defense appropriations are definite with an upper limit on the amount of the 
obligation, the period, and the specific use or purpose. For example, O&M funds are 
expense-type appropriations and have one-year obligation availability. Investment-type 
appropriations have multiple obligation periods due to the complexity and long lead-
times to build or acquire the item (e.g., a building, aircraft, or vehicle). 
Appendix D is the National Defense Authorization Action for fiscal year 2013 for 
wartime contracting. The action provides for the action reporting requirements for the 
Secretary of Defense, and DoD military.   
C. FISCAL LAW 
The United States Constitution, Article I, states, “No Money shall be drawn from 
the Treasury but in Consequence of an Appropriation made by Law…” 
 
Funding comes in the form of legal authority and not money. The legal authority 
binds funding with the constraints of purpose, time, and amount. All appropriations 
have three characteristics that bind the actions of government managers. For an 
appropriation to be available for a legal expenditure, all three of the following must exist:  
(1) the purpose of the obligation or expenditure is authorized, (2) the obligation occurs 
within the time limits prescribed by Congress, and (3) the obligation and expenditure is 
within the amounts prescribed by Congress (GAO, 2009, Chapter 5).   
1. Purpose Statute 
Title 31 of U.S.C. § 1301, Appropriations, General, Application (a), states 
“Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the appropriations were 
made except as otherwise provided by law.”  The statute requires program use funds only 
for the appropriated purposes and programs. This statute is the Necessary Expense 
Doctrine, and it has a three-part test.    
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• The expenditure must be logically related to the appropriation. The 
expenditure must be for a particular statutory purpose or must be 
necessary and incident to proper execution of the general purpose of the 
appropriation. A necessary expense will contribute materially to the 
effective accomplishment of an authorized function.  
 The expenditure must not be prohibited by law. A rationale for the 
necessity of certain expenditure to carry out the mission of the agency is 
insufficient to overcome a statutory prohibition. In addition, agencies may 
presume that restrictions in an appropriations act are effective only for the 
FY covered unless the legislation clearly indicates that the restriction is 
permanent.  
 The expenditure must not be otherwise provided for in a more specific 
appropriation.  “Regardless of a logical relationship between the 
appropriation and the expense, if another specific appropriation applies to 
the given purpose of the expense, it must be used” (DPAP, 2012,  
Chapter 3).  
2. Time Statute 
Under 31 U.S.C. § 1502(a), Balances Available, and 1552, Procedure for 
Appropriation Accounts Available for Definite Periods, an appropriation is available for 
obligation for a definite period. Funds not obligated within that period expire and are no 
longer available for new obligations.   
a. Period of Availability 
Most appropriations are available for obligation purposes for a finite 
period. O&M funds are available for one year, procurement appropriations for three 
years, and construction funds for five years. If the funds are not obligated during these 
periods, they expire and are not available for new obligations. Funds that have expired 
may be used to adjust existing obligations—for example, paying for a price increase after 
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an in-scope change is executed for an existing contract with the appropriate obligation 
adjustment report approval (31 U.S.C. § 1552).  
b. Bona Fide Needs Rule 
The Bona Fide Needs Rule (31 U.S.C. § 1502(a)), Balances Available, 
states, “The balance of an appropriation or fund limited for obligation to a definite period 
is available only for payment of expenses properly incurred during the period of 
availability or to complete contracts properly made within that period of availability and 
obligated consistent with section 1501 of this title. However, the appropriation or fund is 
not available for expenditure for a period beyond the period otherwise authorized by 
law.”  Examples of interpretations to exceptions to the Bona Fide Needs Rule are the 
following: 
• Lead-time: Allows an agency to consider the normal production 
lead-time when determining the need for supplies that are not 
available off the shelf. The lead-time can cross FYs. 
• Stock Level Exception: Allows an agency to purchase enough 
supplies to maintain sufficient stock levels. The agency or program 
may use current year funds to replace stock consumed in the 
current year even though the replacement items are consumed the 
following FY. 
No-year or continuing funds are those included in budgets for long-term 
programs or projects and remain available until exhausted or until the completion of the 
project defined as no-year or continuing funds (GAO, 2002). The Bona Fide Needs Rule, 
which provides that an appropriation limited to obligation for a definite period may be 
obligated only to meet a legitimate need arising during the availability of the 
appropriation, does not apply to the no-year funds, which are not so limited (GAO, 
2009b).  
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3. Amount Statute 
Under 31 U.S.C. § 1517, Prohibited Obligations and Expenditures, agencies may 
not make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an apportionment or other 
formal administrative subdivision of funds. Further, the ADA is a principal statute that 
addresses the amount characteristic by prohibiting government officers or employees 
from the following: 
• Obligating, expending, or authorizing an obligation or expenditure of 
funds in excess of the amount available in an appropriation, an 
apportionment, or a formal subdivision of funds (31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) 
(A)). 
• Incurring an obligation in advance of an appropriation, unless authorized 
by law (31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(B)). 
• Accepting voluntary services, unless otherwise authorized by law (31 
U.S.C. § 1342, 2012). 
If an agency finds itself in possible violation of the Amount Statute, unless it has 
transfer authority or other statutory basis for making further payments, it must seek a 
deficiency or supplemental appropriation from Congress and adjust or curtail operations 
as may be necessary (GAO, 2000).   
It is a criminal act to knowingly enter into or authorize government contracts in 
the absence of sufficient government funds to pay for such contracts. A knowing and 
willful violation of 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a), Limitations on Expending and Obligating 
Amount,  or 31 U.S.C. § 1342, Limitations on Voluntary Services, is punishable by a fine 
of up to $5,000, two years in prison, or both. If someone violates this law, investigation 
begins, and the investigating agency files a written report with Congress.   
DPAP reports the following common problems that trigger ADA violations: 
• Without statutory authority, obligating current-year funds for the bona fide 
needs of a subsequent fiscal year 
• Exceeding a statutory limits or thresholds 
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• Obligating funds for purposes prohibited by annual or permanent 
legislation 
• Obligating funds for a purpose for which Congress has not appropriated 
funds (DPAP 2012, Chapter 3) 
4. Apportionment, Allocations, and Reimbursements 
When an appropriation bill is enacted, and after the beginning of the fiscal year, 
the Treasury issues an appropriation warrant to the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB). The warrant establishes the amount of funds to be withdrawn for each 
appropriation title. With the warrant, the OMB may then apportion funds to the agency. 
Apportionment is the distribution of appropriated amounts available for obligation for 
specific periods, activities, and projects approved by the OMB and the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).  “The purpose of apportionment is to ensure 
that agencies spend at a rate that will keep them within limits imposed by their annual 
appropriations” (Lee Jr., Johnson & Joyce, 2004).   
Figure 1, Appropriation Time Line, provides a graphic for the various types of 
funding. Obligations for the various type of funding range from one year to five years 
with each beginning October 1 and ending at the end the term on September 30. All 
appropriations are available to expend for the following five year until the appropriation 




Figure 1.  Appropriation Time Line  
(From Jones, Candreva, & DeVore, 2012, p. 241) 
O&M funds are apportioned by calendar quarter by the OMB under the authority 
of 31 U.S.C. § 1513. Once the agency receives its apportionment, it allots funds to 
subordinate organizations. Expense accounts (O&M, military personnel [MILPERS]) are 
operating budgets, and investment accounts as allocations.  At the end of the allocation 
process, the USG makes commitments in the form of contracts with private industry, 
intra-governmental reimbursement transactions, and payroll.     
a. Incremental and Severable Funding 
Per DFARS 232.001 (2012), incremental funding means the partial 
funding of a contract or an exercised option, with additional funds anticipated provided 
later. An incrementally funded contract is a contract in which the total work effort is 
performed over multiple periods and funds are allotted to cover specific phases or 
increments of performance.   
Incremental funding obligates funding in segments. The contract design 
should link the obligations to specific milestones of the project or to specific periods. An 
incrementally funded fixed-price contract uses unexpired, available funds as of the date 
the funds are obligated and for severable services (DFARS 232.703–1, 2012). A 
severable project is one where the benefits received by the requiring activity run 
throughout the period of performance  as work is complete; the services are capable of 
being divided into legally distinct rights or obligations as a contract. Examples of 
O&M - 1 year
MilPers - 1 year
RDT&E - 2 years
Procurement - years












severable services include security or dining. According to 10 U.S.C. § 2410(a), an 
annual appropriation may fund a contract for severable services for a period of no longer 
than 12 months, even if the period of performance begins in one FY and continues into a 
subsequent year. 
Fixed-price, labor-hour, and time-and-materials contracts for severable 
services may also be incrementally funded if full funding is not available at the time of 
the contract award and the contracting officer executes a determination and findings, 
approved by the requirements office, justifying the need for incremental funding due to 
the unavailability of funds (FAR 32.7, 2012). 
Upon the contractor’s notice as prescribed in DFARS 223.705-70 (April 
2006), the use of the following Limitation of government’s Obligation clause:  
The contracting officer shall promptly provide written notice to the 
contractor that the Government is either providing additional funds for 
continued performance and increasing the Government’s limitation of 
obligation in a specified amount; terminate the contract; or consider 
whether to allot additional funds; and the contractor is entitled by the 
contract terms to stop work when the Government’s limitation of 
obligation is reached; and any costs expended beyond the Government’s 
limitation of obligation are at the contractor’s risk. In the event that the 
contract receives no further funds, the contracting officer shall terminate 
the contract for convenience of the Government and provide sufficient 
funds to cover the full amount payable to the contractor. (DFARS 
232.7007, April 2006) 
As part of the problems identified in Chapter I, incremental funding is an 
important issue involving contingency contracts. Since the requirements are generally not 
clear and concise, cost-reimbursement contracts create a tool to allow for unforeseen 
costs. Incremental funding is common method for funding cost-reimbursement contracts. 
The use of incremental funding can increase the risk of ADA violations and is 
burdensome to the contract administrator. As addressed previously, the FAR (2012) 
imposes extensive rules for contracting using incremental funding. 
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b. Full and Non-severable Funding 
Fully funded contract require funds that are obligated to cover the total 
price or target price of a fixed-price contract or the estimated cost and any fee of a cost-
reimbursement contract (FAR 32.703-1, 2012). A non-severable service contract is one 
whose benefits to the requiring activity only occur at the end of the contractual period 
with a specific deliverable. In the event performance, full funding is required when 
determination is made that the tasks are not discrete or separate. The services (delivered 
in whole or prior the completion before the requiring activity) must realize any benefit 
from the contract performance. In most cases, funding in full is required for contracts 
with non-severable services at the time of the contract with a then-current appropriations. 
The lead-time exception, noted previously, can apply to the start date of a service-type 
contract (DPAP, 2012. Ch. 3). 
A FY contract may be initiated chargeable to funds of the new FY before 
the funds are available, provided that the contract includes the Availability of Funds FAR 
52.232–18 (2012). This may be used only for O&M and continuing services that are 
necessary for normal operations and for which Congress previously had consistently 
appropriated funds, unless specific statutory authority exists permitting applicability to 
other requirements. 
For the length of one year, annual appropriations fund indefinite quantity 
or requirements contracts for services. An extension beyond the fiscal year in which the 
contract began, provided that the minimum quantities to be acquired are certain in the 
initial fiscal year and that the terms of the availability of funds for the next fiscal year are 
included in the contract  (FAR 52.232-19, 2012). 
“The government shall not accept supplies or services under a contract 
conditioned upon the availability of funds until the Contracting Officer has given the 
contractor notice, to be confirmed in writing, that funds are available”  (FAR 32.703-2(c), 
2012). 
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D. CONTINGENCY FUNDING 
1. Operations and Maintenance Funds and the Downfall of the Reres 
Doctrine 
A $750,000 Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funding threshold exists for 
contingency construction had and increases to a $1,500,000 threshold for issues that 
threaten the life, health, and safety of the warfighter. Larger amounts use funding through 
military construction funds. However, some historical concepts of the Reres Doctrine 
justified the use of O&M funds by looking at the definitions of facilities, contingency, 
and construction. 
Congress created three tiers of funding in 1982: MILCON, unspecified minor 
military construction (UMMC), and O&M. The only approaches were to finance combat 
and contingency construction with the authorized Military Construction Codification Act 
(MCCA; 1982) and the Reres Doctrine. During peacetime and the Cold War period, the 
structure worked well. During contingency periods, the system was “cumbersome and 
slow” and “the lack of a dedicated source of funding for contingency construction needs 
[can] …impede timely response to urgent requirements of armed conflict” (Hughes, 
2005; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-76, 2003). To respond to these combat and contingency 
construction needs, the Reres Doctrine allowed the Army to use/reprogram/transfer 
O&M funds into MILCON funds. For example, the U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM) required construction of a $1 million heliport to support operations in 
Kuwait, which exceeded the $200,000 threshold for O&M at the time. The Staff Judge 
Advocate (SJA), 22nd Support Command, determined that  
The heliport did not fall under the statutory provisions governing minor 
military construction. Accordingly, it was not subject to the O&M 
expenditure cap applicable to such construction. DESERT SHEILD was 
an operation ….Paving the desert was a project more akin to building 
bunkers or constructing anti-tank revetments. As limits to spending O&M 
funding did not apply to real-world operations or to combat-related 
military construction, no bar existed to building the helipad. (Borch, 2001, 
pp. 145–146)  
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The Chief Counsel of the Army Corps of Engineers agreed, and the opinion 
became the basis for many other combat construction projects during Operations Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm. However, the definition of construction provided by Congress 
did not create any “real-world” or “combat-related” exceptions. 
Using the similar legal opinion for the humanitarian assistance appropriations, 
funding for projects in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans, the requirements were 
determined temporary operational requirements and not military construction. In Haiti, 
LOGCAP spent more than $96 million of O&M funding for providing electricity to 
buildings and installing perimeter lighting and fencing and construction base camps 
(Center for Law & Military Operations [CLAMO], 2004).  
Relying on the Purpose Statute, the Army’s Office of the General Counsel 
produced a policy memorandum for the proper funds to use for the construction of 
facilities to support military operations, states “O&M funds were primary funding source 
supporting contingency or combat operations” (Dorn, 2005). Therefore, O&M funds 
where “the appropriate funding source for acquisition of materials and/or costs of 
erection of structures…that are clearly intended to meet a temporary operational 
requirement [during] combat or contingency operations” (Reres Memo, 2000). The 
document intended to differentiate between contingency “acquisitions” and “military 
construction” by noting, “such structures may not be used for the purpose of satisfying 
the requirements of a permanent nature at the conclusion of combat or contingency 
operations” (Reres Memo, 2000). The Reres Doctrine created its own definition of 
construction supporting combat operations, which is different from the existing 
construction definition at the time. Therefore, the military authorized the use of O&M 
funds for combat and contingency construction, used/reprogrammed/transferred O&M 
dollars into any amount of MILCON funds necessary to accomplish the mission. This 
eliminates the congressional limitations as to both purpose and amount (Hughes, 2005). 
In February 2003, while the U.S. forces were conducting Operation Enduring 
Freedom in Afghanistan and preparing for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Undersecretary 
of Defense authorized using O&M funds for construction under “narrowly limited 
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conditions” (SECDEF, 2003). These conditions identified where O&M appropriations 
may be obligated and expended for construction if 
1. There is proper documented determination that the construction is 
necessary to meet an urgent military operational requirement of a 
temporary nature, while U.S. Forces are participating in armed conflict or 
contingency operations…; 
2. The construction will not be carried out at a military installation…or at a 
location where the U.S. is reasonably expected to have a long-term interest 
or presence; and 
3. The U.S. has no intention to use the construction after the operational 
requirement has been satisfied and the nature of the construction is the 
minimum necessary to meet the temporary operational need.  (Hughes, 
2005) 
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the DoD reliance of the Reres Doctrine was 
crucial in the buildup and completion of thousands of construction projects in Kuwait and 
Iraq, including base camps, logistical support areas (LSAs), hundreds of helipads, C-130 
airstrips, unmanned aerial vehicle landing strips, and hundreds of miles of improved 
roads and pipelines. During the planning of the invasion of Iraq, the Iraq Marine 
Expeditionary Force (I MEF) bridge assets were needed to cross the rivers along the 
attach route through the eastern region of Iraq. The I MEF wanted the purchase of pre-
fabricate bridges that exceeded the O&M threshold, costing several million dollars each, 
relying upon the Department of the Army  and DoD memos to recommend the use of 
O&M as a “legally defensible alternative course of Global War on Terror (GWOT) 
action” (Hughes, 2005). Eventually, the I MEF ended up procuring the bridges using 
procurement dollars. Without the reliance of the Reres Doctrine, the military would not 
have been able to respond quickly in the uncertain security environment for the buildup 
for Operation Iraqi Freedom, requiring the completion of construction projects in Kuwait 
and Iraq. Should the military have relied on military construction appropriations when 
military operations in Afghanistan began on October 07, 2001, the military would have 
incurred ADA violations. For FY2002 (after the September 11, 2001, attack), the FY2002 
Military Construction Appropriations Act was signed in November 2001. The next 
annual appropriation cycle did not begin until June 2002 for FY2003, becoming law in 
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October 2002. These timing delays would have had a severe influence the mission, due to 
the mission’s immediate urgency and need for rapid response.  
In April 2003, Congress passed the FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, which included language that posed an objection to the Reres 
Doctrine, amending the MCCA definition of military installations to include the 
language “regardless of whether such use is anticipated to be temporary or of longer 
duration.”  (Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003)  Congress 
stated,  
Approximately $750 million appropriated to operations and maintenance 
accounts have been obligated for construction activities supporting the 
global war on terrorism and operations in Iraq. Funds for these projects 
have been expended without providing notice to Congress despite repeated 
requests for information…and as required by law. (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
108–76, 2003) 
Congress observed that the DoD had circumvented “the statutorily mandated 
military construction process” and “created a class of construction activities for which it 
deemed operation and maintenance funds could be expended” (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-
76, 2003).  “[W]without benefit of legal authority or regulation, the statutory definition of 
‘military construction’ was obviated for certain types of construction projects” (H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 108-76, 2003). Congress went on to reject the DoD’s argument that 
“long-standing practice [enabled] it to utilize this legal construct under certain 
circumstances despite its effect of vitiating and/or amending the underlying statute” (H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 108-76, 2003). Specifically, Congress denied the DoD the authority to 
issue a policy that “turns an alleged practice into de facto law” (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-
76, 2003; Hughes, 2005). 
The National Defense Authorization Action for Fiscal Year 2013 (Appendix E) in 
Section 2803, amended the MCAA for fiscal year 2004 to extend through fiscal year 
2013 the DoD to have the authority to use O&M funds for construction projects “outside 
the United States, which are necessary to meet urgent military operational requirements 
of a temporary nature” (NDAA, 2012, Sec. 2803). 
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2. Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Funds 
According to DPAP, humanitarian and civic assistance is the DoD term for relief 
and development activities that take place in the context of an overseas military exercise, 
training event, or operation. Under the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Program, U.S. 
military personnel participating in overseas deployments also carry out humanitarian 
activities such as road and school construction, vaccination of children and animals, and 
well digging. Host-country civilian and military personnel assist the execution of 
humanitarian and civic assistance programs. U.S. National Guard or reserve units also 
perform many humanitarian and civic assistance activities.  
Funding for overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid (OHDACA) provides 
relief to foreign countries. The use of OHDACA funds requires the DoD to provide 15 
days’ advance notice to Congress before transferring any defense articles or services to 
another nation or an international organization for use in United Nations peace-related 
operations or any other international peacekeeping, peace enforcement, or humanitarian 
assistance operation (DPAP, 2012, Ch. 3). 
3. Commanders’ Emergency Response Program 
The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program’s (CERP) design is to enable 
local commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction requirements in their AORs by implementing programs that immediately 
help the indigenous population. The CERP funds help the Iraqi and Afghan people 
without direct or indirect benefit to the United States, coalition, or other supporting 
military personnel. Typical use of CERP funds include  small-scale, low-dollar, short-
term, employment-oriented, emergency, and high-visibility projects that benefit the Iraqi 
and Afghan people (DoD, 2013). Appendix C provides for the National Defense 
Authorization Actions for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. For the fiscal year 2013, 
CERP funding reduced in half from $400 million to $200 million. We examine potential 
violations of fiscal law using CERP funds.  
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4. Defense Emergency Response Fund 
Since September 2001, Congress responded to funding need for the terrorist 
attacks with the use of the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF). It was also a 
case of delegated budget authority to the DoD. In October 2003, the Iraqi Freedom Fund 
received the balance of funds through a transfer from the DERF. The DERF account was 
designed to provide flexibility and immediate obligation authority when requirements 
were not specific and in times of crisis (Candreva & Jones, 2005). We examine the 
challenges incurred using DERF. 
5. Afghanistan Security Forces Fund  
The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) funds the current war on terror in 
Afghanistan. The ASFF budget provides the resource foundation needed to train and 
equip a 352,000 Afghan National Security Force and a 30,000 Afghan Local Police 
Force. The FY2013 budget request marks a shift as emphasis moves from building, 
equipping, and training to professionalizing and sustaining the force. The top priorities 
are leadership development and building enduring institutions. In FY2012, Congress 
enacted $11.2 billion for the ASFF; the request for FY2013 was $5.7 billion. According 
to the FY2013 request, the Coalition is transitioning the lead for security to the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in tranches, completed during 2011; 
the schedule to begin the next tranche was in May 2012. The FY2013 ASFF budget 
request will allow the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to continue on 
a path to assume the lead for all security operations by the end of 2014. 
E. TYPES OF FUNDS 
In this section, we describe the categories of funding during contingencies within 
defense appropriations. Each category has its own peculiar rules referring to the “Color of 
Money” for different fund purposes. Using the wrong type of fund may result in a 
violation of the purpose statute. It is important to understand the differences and 
limitations of the different types of funds. 
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1. Military Construction  
a. Definition 
The term military construction in the U.S. Military Construction Code 
includes “any construction, development, conversion, or extension of any kind carried out 
with respect to a military installation whether to satisfy temporary or permanent 
requirements” (10 U.S.C. § 2801(a)). This includes any work necessary to produce a 
complete and usable facility, whether new or existing. Construction projects that exceed 
$1.5 million in value require specific approval by Congress (DPAP, 2012, Chapter 3).  
In USFOR-A (2012), the term construction is further defined to include 
the erection, installation, or assembly of a new facility; the addition, expansion, 
extension, alteration, conversion, or replacement of an existing facility; relocation of a 
facility from one installation to another installation; installed equipment (e.g., built-in 
furniture, cabinets, shelving, venetian blinds, screens, elevators, telephones, fire alarms, 
heating and air conditioning equipment, waste disposals, dishwashers, generators, and 
theater seats); related site preparation, excavation, filling, landscaping, and other land 
improvements; and generators supporting real property.  
Under FAR 36.102, the term construction refers to the construction, 
alteration, or repair of buildings, structures, or other real property. Construction includes 
dredging, excavating, and painting. Construction does not include work performed on 
vessels, aircraft, or other items of personal property. 
A military installation is defined in the U.S. Military Construction Code, 
10 U.S.C. § 2801(c)(4)), as “a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, or other activity 
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department or, in the case of an 
activity in a foreign country, under the operational control of the Secretary of a military 
department or the SECDEF” (10 U.S.C. § 2801(c)(4), 2012). The definition of military 
installation is also very broad and includes foreign real estate under the operational 
control of the U.S. military.   
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MILCON, according to the U.S. Military Construction Code, includes all 
work necessary to produce a complete and usable facility (or a complete and usable 
improvement to an existing facility. 10 U.S.C. § 2801(b)). The process of determining 
what a “complete and usable facility” is the project scope or scoping. Splitting or 
incrementing the cost of a project to reduce costs below an approval threshold or the 
ceiling amount is prohibited by Army Regulation 415-32, also known as “project-
splitting.”  This can happen when several projects occur at the same time or in a close 
proximity. To avoid incrementation or project splitting, each part of the project in itself 
must be complete and usable, and the total project is not complete until all parts are 
complete. The application of project cost accounting for interdependent facilities to 
account for costs. Contractor consideration of using this more costly process weighed 
with the financial costs to the contractor and the ultimate benefit to the government.  
“Project accounting” is set up as a requirement in the contract terms. Interrelated facilities 
are mutually dependent in supporting those functions, having a common support purpose 
but are not mutually dependent. When comparing two facilities, neither is necessary for 
the operation of the other. Separate projects or interrelated facilities use separate project 
costs. We provide cases studies that challenge the programs and contracting teams 
involving interdependent and interrelated facilities and the impulse by requirement 
generators to increment or use project splitting to stay within the threshold limitations 
under current fiscal laws to meet the urgent needs. 
b. Military Construction Funding  
MILCON funding is required to execute infrastructure improvements 
supporting military operations.  
i. Specified Major Construction. Specified major construction, 
referred to as the Baseline / Master Plan Priority List, used for major facility investment 
projects exceeding $750,000 using a five-year appropriation, are submitted to Congress 
for approval as inclusion in a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) approximately 
two to three years prior to execution. A Congress line item authorization is required. This 
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funding is only meant for steady state requirements at enduring locations, as defined in 
the CENTCOM (USFOR-A, 2012). 
Specified major construction, referred to as Contingency 
Construction Priority List or Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO), is for major 
facility investment projects exceeding the $750,000 threshold. The appropriation 
duration, as authorized in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), is typically 
two or three years. Since these projects are for overseas operations, submission of the 
project for inclusion in the President’s budget is 18 months prior to the year of execution. 
Congress approves these projects, and a Congress line item authorization is required. 
According to the USFOR-A (2012), contingency MILCON is specifically for projects 
that directly support combat operations. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
does not permit contingency MILCON requests for bases in the CENTCOM Theater 
Posture Plan unless they are located in Afghanistan and support current contingency 
requirements (USFOR-A, 2012). 
ii. Unspecified Minor Military Construction. Congress provides 
annual funding and approval for UMMC projects, not otherwise authorized by law, in the 
Military Construction Appropriations Act to each military department. A UMMC project 
is a military construction project with construction costs of $2,000,000 or less (the 
threshold increases to $3,000,000 if the project solely corrects an immediate deficiency 
that threatens life, health, or safety). A 21-day congressional notification period is 
required (seven days if completed electronically). Approval for within the military 
department by the Service Secretary can take between six to nine months, as long as 
funds are available. The appropriation, authorized in the NDAA, is typically for two to 
three years (USFOR-A, 2012). 
c. Contingency Construction Authority 
CCA is a fiscal authority (not a separate appropriation) that allows the use 
of O&M funds on projects that would otherwise require MILCON funding. O&M is a 
one-year appropriation. Congress limits total project approval authority to levels 
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specified in the NDAA; recently, this has been $300 million in CCA for projects in 
Afghanistan. The Secretary of Defense approves projects CCA funds (or as currently 
delegated to the Under Secretary of Defense [Comptroller]) usually takes between six and 
nine months, requiring a 10-day congressional notification period (seven days if 
completed electronically). The typical cutoff for submissions is May of each year to 
ensure the ability to award funding by end of the FY. 
CCA projects must meet the following requirements: 
• Construction is necessary to meet urgent military 
operational requirements of a temporary nature involving 
the use of the Armed Forces in support of a declaration of 
war, the declaration by the President of a national 
emergency under Section 201 of the National Emergencies 
Act, or a contingency operation;   
• Construction is not carried out at a military installation 
where the United States is reasonably expected to have a 
long-term presence, unless the installation is in 
Afghanistan; 
• The U.S. has no intention of using the construction after the 
operational requirements have been satisfied; and 
• Level of construction is the minimum necessary to meet the 
temporary operational requirements.  (USFOR-A, 2012) 
 
d. 2808 Reprogramming 
In cases where Congress does not authorize funds, the Secretary of 
Defense can authorize MILCON projects with congressional notification and use already 
appropriated MILCON funding from bid savings or cancelled projects exceeding the 
O&M $750,000 threshold. The appropriation duration is the same as the original 
appropriation. The approval process may take six to nine months. 
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2. Operation and Maintenance Funding 
O&M funding provides resources required to conduct and sustain combat 
operations. O&M is the lifeblood of U.S. military daily operations. O&M funding 
influences almost everything that U.S. forces do on the battlefield is either directly or 
indirectly. The period of execution for O&M is one year (October 1 to September 30). In 
order to comply with the Purpose Statute, USFOR-A (2012) is stating O&M funds are 
ineligible for the following: 
• Purchases of or systems of personal property equal to or in excess 
of $250,000.  
• Projects with funded construction costs  of $750,000 or more (U.S. 
Department of Army, 2010).  
• Projects with repair costs greater than or equal to $750,000 when 
the repair to replacement ratio is greater than 50%, which needs 
Army Central Command (ARCENT) approval. 
• Subsistence of military personnel (e.g., food, bottled water, and 
ice). 
• Purchase of “in lieu of” substitutions for Military Table of 
Equipment (MTOE) items. 
• Purchase of items centrally managed unless authorized specifically 
by an ONS & JUONS. 
• Purchase of gifts or individual awards, except for specifically 
authorized awards programs coordinated through the appropriate 
departments (e.g., safety Awards). 
• Funding North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
International Joint Commission, International Security Assistance 
Force, or missions of Coalition Forces. However, there are times 
when organizations provide support on a reimbursable basis.  
• Funding Afghan National Security Force requirements (e.g., 
messing, lodging, training, force protection) unless on a 
reimbursable basis. (USFOR-A, 2012) 
O&M funding is exclusive for maintenance and repairs. According to DA PAM 
420-10, Facilities engineering: Construction and facilities management office operations, 
defines maintenance as the “work required to preserve or maintain a facility in such 
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condition that it may be used effectively for its designated purpose (U.S. Department of 
Army, 2012).”  It includes work required to prevent damage and sustain components 
(e.g., replacing disposable filters, painting, caulking, refastening loose siding, and sealing 
bituminous pavements). 
Under 10 U.S.C. § 2811(e), a repair project is defined as a project to restore a real 
property facility, system, or component to such a condition that the military department 
or agency may use it effectively for its designated functional purpose. Use of O&M funds 
to pay for repair costs is appropriate to restore a facility or facility component to such a 
condition that the Army may use it for its designated purpose. Consideration as a repair 
project must show that facility exists and be in a failed or failing condition. DA PAM 
420-1 (2012) authorized repair by replacement.   
3. Procurement Funding  
Procurement appropriations fund the acquisition of capital items that benefit 
future periods. Examples of the use of procurement funds include the purchase of 
equipment, vehicles, and large tools (DPAP2012, Chapter 3). 
The importance of using procurement funding is that the equipment purchased 
using procurement funds becomes government property. The government can make the 
determination of the disposal of the property after the expiration of the use and purpose 
of the property. In the case study of this research will show the impacts of using 
procurement funds versus O&M funds in a lease versus buy case example. 
4. Military Personnel 
MILPERS appropriations fund the payroll for those serving in the military. These 
funds are limited to one year. MILPERS funding and Federal Supply Service (FSS) is the 
use of organic resources (military personnel and government property). The military 
performs combat duties in theater as well as supporting the warfighter. The use of 
LOGCAP contractors allows military personnel to conduct wartime operations. In the 
case studies, the research shows how the use of organic resources reduces the costs of 
projects in order to fit within statutory O&M limitations. 
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5. Other Funding Sources 
In addition to the regular appropriations provided in the base and OCO budgets, 
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars had some unique sources of funding. The intention is that 
these sources are more flexible than the routine sources of funding, but that flexibility 
was unusual, causing problems for both operational commanders and contracting officers. 
a. Commander’s Emergency Response Program   
CERP funds enable local commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to respond 
to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their AORs by 
carrying out programs that will immediately assist the indigenous population. Initial 
resources for that effort came from stockpiles of Ba’athist Party cash left behind by 
Saddam Hussein’s regime. This cash funded CERP, along with other regime assets 
recovered following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein (Lee, 2010). 
Initially, when commanders in the field received the authority to use the 
$500,000 or more of CERP funds, confusion delayed use because the commanders 
thought the funds would fall under the restrictions of FAR bureaucracy of a 45-day plus 
source selection process. However, after further investigation, Congress had been clear 
that the intent for CERP money was to give commanders broad discretion in how they 
establish the methods of accounting for the use of the funds.  
Today, CERP is available to commanders to respond to urgent 
humanitarian relief, reconstruction requirements, and stability operations, including civil 
security and restoring essential services, governance, and infrastructure (Lee, 2010). The 
use of CERP funds is more complicated in a contingency contracting environment, with 
the extended responsibilities of strict accounting and oversight of the funds placed on the 
commanders as compared to the use of O&M funds. 
The DODIG reported needed improvements in the CERP program 
whereby the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and U.S. Forces – Afghanistan 
(USFOR-A) had control over the CERP contract payments. They were unable to maintain 
adequate and report reliable data. The DoD allocated about $3.2 billion in CERP funds to 
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support the operations in Afghanistan, obligating $2 billion and disbursing $1.5 billion. 
DoDIG recommended that the USFOR-A improve the quality of the CERP data provided 
to Congress, assess the program’s effectiveness, and ensure that the funds are used for the 
most beneficial and sustainable projects (DoDIG, 2012).      
In March 2013, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
(SIGIR) reported lessons learned from over the nine-year reconstruction effort in Iraq, 
stating that the CERP program “produced successes when used judiciously.”  The best 
CERP projects in Iraq according to General Lloyd Austin where requirement teams size 
situations to wisely target to meet local needs. The most unstable the situation, the small 
the project should be (Bowen, 2013, p. 130). General Petraeus stated that there were a 
number of notable successes in the Iraq program along with the Interior Ministers in Iraq 
complimenting the crucial contributions provided by the MNS-I (Bowen, 2013).    
b. Defense Emergency Response Fund  
Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) was an existing account 
designed to provide flexibility in times of crisis and to provide immediate obligation 
authority at times when a need arose but before the specifics of the operation is available. 
The global war on terrorism was just that sort of scenario. Created in FY1990, DERF 
provides a source of immediate funding in the event that the military responds to a 
domestic problem, such as hurricane relief. In 2001, DERF became a convenient tool for 
funding the initial response to the September 11, 2001, attacks. The fund was extremely 
flexible, and the normal purpose, time, and amount restrictions were almost nonexistent. 
The funds, with no expiration date, are applicable for anything related to the response to 
the terrorist attacks, and they had no expiration date. 
Commanders found the development of requirements difficult when 
attempting to predict funding amounts for appropriations, particularly in situations of 
unknown or changing requirements. Constraints imposed by fiscal laws in place directly 
relates to the. Without this information, the amount of risk of fiscal violations is high. 
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The DERF account provided the ability to allow military commanders to enter 
contingency environments and provide the necessary items to complete urgent missions. 
DERF was to allow the DoD to provide disaster relief assistance without 
depleting the funds it needs to accomplish its mission. DERF centralized DoD financial 
accounting for the disaster assistance it provides. Examples of the use of DERF include 
the following: in 1991, used for disaster relief in Bangladesh; in 1994, used for refugee 
assistance in Rwanda, Cuba, and Haiti, and for humanitarian assistance on nine other 
overseas projects; and in 2006, used to assist the earthquake victims in Pakistan. In 
FY1995, DERF increased to $299.3 million to cover FY1994 costs in Rwanda and Cuba, 
after initially funded for $100 million. DERF is not a reimbursable account.   
DERF funding had its complications when the Department of State was to 
reimburse DERF for 11 overseas projects totaling $12.1 million as reported by the DoD 
Inspector General in 2008. Since DERF is not a reimbursable account, the DoDIG 
recommended de-obligating the funds and returning them to the treasury (DoDIG, 2008).    
GAO Report 03-346 (2003) found that the DoD’s ability to track the use 
of emergency response funds had varying limitations depending on the appropriation. For 
the initial fiscal years of 2001 and 2002, separate management existed for the emergency 
response funds in DERF ($15 billion). The DoD broke down obligations in 10 funding 
categories. The GAO could not correlate the information with its appropriation account 
structure. For DERF provided in FY 2002 and FY2003 ($20.5 billion), transfers were 
placed into regular DoD appropriation accounts. Commingling funds made tracking the 
use of the 2002 and 2003 funds difficult. The intention of the DoD was to track 
obligation for contingency operations related to the war on terrorism. Methods put into 
place did not accomplish the intent. In 2002, the DoD acknowledged the limitations and 
implemented additional reporting on the use of the funds.   
As previously discussed in the Literature Review, multiple definitions of 
terms are an issue when working in a contingency environment and with the use of funds. 
In September 2001, the OMB issued specific guidelines and criteria to identify and 
evaluate requirements funded under the initial emergency supplement appropriations. 
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This guidance outlined 15 conditions to meet when determining two areas—response and 
recovery, and preparedness and mitigation. The conditions stipulate that the requirements 
must be “known, not speculative, urgent, not reasonably handled at a later time, and 
unable to reasonably met through the use of existing agency funds” (GAO, 2003). 
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III. ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT AGENCY REGULATIONS 
AND PUBLICATIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to review significant agency reports that address 
fiscal law concerns related to contingency contracting environments. The costs of the 
GWOT has created a lot of visibility and focus by Congress, resulting in agencies 
conducting investigations, audits, and reports on the activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Kuwait, and other contingency areas. In this chapter, we focus on the Gansler report 
(2007 and 2010 briefing), the Commission on War Time Contracting report, specific 
GAO reports and DoDIG reports related to contingency contracting, changes in the FAR, 
and laws related to contingency contracts and their impact on fiscal laws. We review 
these reports to illustrate the nature of the problem and to highlight the need for further 
changes in acquisition and fiscal laws to support mission needs in contingency 
environments.   
A. ANALYSIS OF ARMY ACQUISITION AND PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
IN EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS REPORTS (GANSLER REPORT) 
1. Background of the Study 
The Secretary of the Army established an independent Commission on Army 
Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations to review the lessons 
learned in recent operations and provide forward-looking recommendations to ensure that 
future military operations achieve greater effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency. The 
Commission assessed process (including internal controls), personnel, organization, 
training, policy, and regulation, as well as explored legislative solutions, to ensure that 
the Army is properly equipped for future expeditionary operations1 (Gansler, 2010, p. 1).  
 
                                                 
1 The term expeditionary includes both OCONUS and domestic emergency operations. The 
Commission believes that the term expeditionary—rather than contingency—is a broader term that better 
encompasses any future national defense and national security missions. The Commission therefore uses 
this term throughout the report. 
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2. Results of the Study 
The 2007 Report and 2010 Gansler briefing found that the critical segments of the 
“Institutional Army” were not adapted in order to enable responsive acquisitions and 
sustainment for expeditionary operations. The contracting, regulations, and processes 
were specific areas of concern in the report that relate to our research of contracting in a 
contingency environment. These key failures encumber the Army acquisition system’s 
performance and have significantly contribute to the waste, fraud, and abuse in theater by 
Army personnel (Gansler briefing, 2010, p. 1). 
The Commission found that the Army contingency contracting personnel 
managed by personnel policies are “both out-of-date and irrelevant to the Army mission 
and challenges of today, especially those of expeditionary operations” (Gansler, 2007, p. 
13). Contracting officers complained of the use of incremental funding on contract. This 
one area surprised the Commission. They expected   concerned from the contracting 
officers in the field about the color of money. All of the contracting officers noted that 
they were “COMPLETELY and UNNECESSARILY {capitalized for emphasis} 
burdened by incremental funding of requirements” (Gansler, 2010, p. 25). According to 
Gansler, “contracting assets are over-burdened in the field. The Army is providing 
operations and maintenance funds incrementally to contracting officers, at monthly or 
even shorter intervals” (Gansler, 2010, p. 25). The report (Gansler, 2010) concluded that 
the a solution to address the funding challenge by using an “Overseas Contingency 
Operations Transfer Fund” approach, but only if adequately resourced. This type of 
funding would be a defense transfer fund without Color of Money or fiscal year 
limitations (Gansler, 2010, p. 25). 
Nearly eight years have lapsed since the issuance of the 2007 Gansler report. The 
incremental funding issue continues to be an administrative burden to the contracting 
commands. As of March 1, 2013, (and in prior periods of budget continuing resolution 
periods), the government entered into a phase of sequestration resulting in major budget 
reductions for the DoD. With funding for programs reduced, a shortage results in 
funding. With the use of historical burn rates, inconsistent receipt of funding increments 
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is common. Funding documents amounts received are those that are available rather than 
applicable to an amount forecasted, requested, or historically based.  
Funding burdens extend to the military in the field where concerns and stresses on 
commands where funds are imperative not made available to continue operations. 
Contractors also become anxious when funds are in short supply and when contracting 
officer have the options to issue a stop work order or a cancellation of contract for 
convenience.   
3. Analysis of Fiscal Law Impacts 
Gansler briefing (2010) stated that the “Defense requirements, acquisition, and 
budgeting system is not geared for this [urgent needs] environment” (Gansler briefing, 
2010, p. 5). He recognizes progress made during the previous eight years, but the Defense 
ad hoc “rapid” processes still experience “unnecessary and bureaucratic delays in needs 
generation and vetting of urgent needs, and in fulfillment and field of urgent solutions”  
(Gansler briefing, 2010, p. 5).   
Appendix G is a graphic of the DoD organizations and the 21 Urgent/Rapid 
Programs that Gansler included in his 2010 briefing (Gansler briefing, 2010, p. 14). The 
graphic shows the multitude of programs that make identification of the correct funding 
source difficult when engaging in a joint capability contingency mission. No consistent 
system or coordination exists for all of the military and agencies to document services, 
performance, and costs. These systems lack methods to assess sustainment needs and 
subsequent costs (Gansler briefing, 2010). Each Service has to work around methods for 
the procurement of materials and services in emergency-type situations. It is evident in 
this graphic that there is a need to coordinate and consolidate funding types to reduce the 
confusion throughout the DoD that is a challenge for the contracting officer. In 
contingency environments, many Services, agencies, and branches work together to meet 
mission needs. When funding sources come from various areas, confusion can take place 
whether there is a need for reimbursement funds or funds used by another Service, 
agency, or branch, resulting in potential violations of fiscal law. For example, national 
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disasters may involve the Department of Homeland Security and/or Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA). We provide an example of this in Chapter IV, Case 
Studies. Appendix K, provided in the Gansler, 2010 briefing, also shows how each 
service has different urgent needs process, and complications that can occur when 
missions require joint services. 
B. ANALYSIS OF COMMISSION ON WARTIME CONTRACTING REPORT 
1. Background of the CWC Study 
Congress established the CWC in 2008 to assess contracting for reconstruction, 
logistics, and security functions; examine the extent of waste, fraud, and abuse; and 
provide recommendations. The Commission made recommendations about contracting 
practices in current and future contingency environments (GAO, 2012b). The CWC final 
report issued in August 2011 reported 15 recommendations to Congress.   
2. Results of the CWC Study 
The CWC (2011) study noted the large number of contractors in Afghanistan and 
Iraq and the excessive burdens placed on the contracting communities to manage them. 
The 2011 report stated that total spending on contracts and grants in theater since FY2002 
exceeded $190 billion. The report summarized the recommendations into the following 
categories: 
• Agencies over-rely on contractors for contingency operations 
• “Inherently Governmental” rules do not guide appropriate use of 
contractors in contingencies 
• Inattention to contingency contracting leads to massive waste, 
fraud, and abuse 
• Looming sustainment costs risk massive new waste 
• Agencies have not institutionalized acquisition as a core function 
• Agency structures and authorities prevent effective interagency 
coordination 
• Contract competition, management, and enforcement are 
ineffective 
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• The way forward demands major reforms 
• Congress should provide or reallocate resources for contingency-
contracting reform to cure or mitigate the numerous defects 
described by the Commission 
• Congress should enact legislation requiring regular assessment and 
reporting of agencies’ progress in implementing reform 
recommendations (CWC, 2011, p. 4-5). 
 
3. Analysis of the CWC Report and Fiscal Law Impacts 
The CWC (2011) report did not specifically identify discussions or inquiries of 
any impacts of fiscal law on the contingency environment. Fiscal concerns were 
addressed within the report includes discussion of the use of emergency spending and 
supplemental appropriations. The larger contractors addressed in the CWC report funded 
with O&M funds that limit the programs. The report (CWC, 2011) stated that for the past 
10 years, “overseas contingency-operations funding has been designed as “emergency 
spending,” and funded through supplemental appropriations” (CWC, 2011, p. 32). These 
excluded appropriations from the regular budgetary process can distort the size of the 
federal budget submission by segregating substantial proposed expenditures as 
“subsequent supplement submissions” (CWC, 2011, p. 32). This allows agencies to avoid 
a prioritization of their program requirements in support of the war efforts, and full costs 
of contracting. The CWC (2011) report stated that this creates an “illusion that 
contractors in a war zone are a free resource” (CWC, 2011, p. 32).   
The CWC supports our position that the use of one type of fund (O&M) impedes 
and places challenges on leadership to obtain the resources needed to complete their 
mission in a contingency environment. This acknowledgement supports our study of 
constraints of fiscal law in a contingency contracting environment. 
C. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORTS 
The United States GAO compiles ADA information for each fiscal year and 
reports all relevant facts and a statement of action taken. The information is generally 
provided unaudited from the reporting agency (GAO, 2013). These reports provide a 
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summary of the ADA violations, including the agency, amount, violation statute, dates, a 
brief description of the violation, and the remediation. We analyze all of these cases as a 
whole for the periods of 2005–2012 and look more specifically at those that occurred due 
to contingency operational environments. 
According to the GAO website, DoD Contract Management is a high risk, and a 
key issue of focus. The website states that the DoD obligated approximately $360 billion 
on contracts for goods and services in FY2012. Contracts also included those in support 
of contingency operations, such as Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (GAO, 
2013). Much like the CWC (2011) report, the GAO reports that at times, “the lack of an 
adequate number of trained acquisition and contract oversight personnel, the use of ill-
suited contracting arrangements, and the absence of a strategic approach for acquiring 
services placed DoD at risk of not getting needed goods and services in a timely manner 
or potentially paying more than necessary” (GAO, 2013, p. 213).  
An earlier 2008 GAO report states anti-deficiency controls and investigations 
need improvement. The GAO-08-1063 (2008) report stated that the DoD’s complex and 
inefficient payment processes, non-integrated business systems, and weak internal 
controls impaired the DoD’s ability to “maintain proper funds control, leaving the 
department at risk of over obligating or overspending its appropriations in violation of the 
ADA”  (GAO, 2008, p.1).  
During the DoD’s statement before the panel on Defense Financial Management 
and Auditability Reform in September 2011, Asif A. Khan, Director, Financial 
Management and Assurance, U.S. GAO, stated, “Funds control weaknesses place DoD at 
risk of violating the Antideficiency Act (ADA), ADA, specifically through over 
obligations and over expenditures” (Kahn, 2011, p. 1). The ADA was enacted to prevent 
agencies from incurring obligations or making expenditures in excess or in advance of 
appropriations.”  The ADA requires DoD to report on its ADA violations. For the 5-year 
time period from fiscal year 2007 through September 15, 2011, DoD reported 64 ADA 
violations, with a “total dollar amount of just over $927 million” (Kahn, 2011, p. 1). 
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However, DoD’s reporting of ADA violations may not be complete because of other 
pervasive internal control weaknesses (GAO, 2011).   
D. DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT 10-059 
DoDIG Report 10-059 (2010) is primarily about fraud and does not offer insights 
with respect to fiscal law constraints. However, the DoD contracting and financial 
management process has inherent risks for ADA violations probably exacerbated in a 
contingency environment.   
DoDIG Report 10-059 (2010) reviewed the key aspects of the contracting process 
and found the 10 systemic issues that included requirements, contract pricing, oversight 
and surveillance, property accountability, and financial management, refer to Appendix I. 
The chart specifically states that “-financial management of funds for contract” (DoDIG, 
2010) is one of the systemic issues of the contracting process. In 2012, the DoDIG issued 
a follow-up report reflecting that “Financial management of fund for contract to include:   
• Ensuring appropriated funds are used to fund the contract 
• Ensuring fund obligations are not in excess of appropriated funding 
(DoDIG, 2012, p. iii)  
The DoD had not completed corrective actions for 177 recommendations made from the 
previous reports between 2007 and 2010. The Financial Management recommendations 
totaled 79. As of the 2012 report, 21 recommendations remain open, which is 44% of the 
total recommendations. The DoDIG recommended that the “contracting officer should 
make sure that appropriate financial management occurs for the life of the contract to 
include the type and amount of funds being obligated to the contract. Maintenance of 
complete, consistent, and accurate contract files and accounting records is necessary to 
reduce the potential for violations of the Antideficiency Act…”  (DoDIG, 2012, p. 37)  
Fourteen contingency contracting reports identified financial management problems 
including management of funds in accordance with laws and regulations and preventing 
potential ADA violations (DoDIG, 2012). 
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1. Results of Study 
The maintenance of complete, consistent, and accurate contract files and 
accounting records is necessary to reduce the potential for violations of the ADA. After 
review of several audit reports and investigations by the GAO and DoDIG our 
overarching references  indicate that the government does not have sufficient internal 
controls and business systems to identify and accurately account for obligations and 
payments resulting in numerous potential ADA violations that may have gone undetected 
or resolved during the audit and not reported. Unidentified and uncorrected root causes 
for these violations cause concern to the government.   
2. Analysis of Fiscal Law Impacts  
As part of this research, we looked at potential ADA violations. Although this is 
not part of the DoDIG (2012) investigations report, constraints of fiscal laws are a 
concern. The concern is that there may be an additional “Potential ADA” violations or 
Funding or Obligation issues still under investigation, shown as “X” in the last columns 
of Appendix J, Contracting Problem Areas by Audit Report under column Financial 
Management of the DoDIG Report 10-134. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDIES 
This chapter looks at both documented cases and realistic, but hypothetical, 
examples of situations where fiscal law places constraints on contracting in a contingency 
environment. The first section presents the more significant GAO ADA findings that 
occurred in a contingency environment. The second section presents realistic scenarios of 
impacts to military missions by contracting personnel through delays, extra costs, or 
extending the scope to meet the guidelines in order to avoid violating fiscal law. The 
cases are on actual or likely events and supplied to illustrate potential problems; one 
should not infer from them that any actual violation of fiscal law or contracting 
regulations occurred.   
A. ANALYSIS OF GAO ANTIDEFICIENCY ACT CASES IN 
CONTINGENCY ENVIRONMENTS 
As noted previously, the GAO records ADA violations and reviews controls and 
investigations. The GAO (2011) reported that the DoD’s complex and inefficient 
payment process, non-integrated business systems, and weak internal controls impair the 
DoD’s ability to “maintain proper funds control, leaving the department at risk of over 
obligating or overspending its appropriations in violation of ADA”  (Kahn, 2011, p.1). 
Additional findings of the report show that the DoD has not fully complied with 
regulations due to the following:  a lack of training, poor documentation, investigative 
personnel were not always available; the investigating officer(s) were not 
organizationally independent as “free of personal or external impairments to 
independence”;  and the investigations were not completed on time (GAO, 2008, p. 1).   
Because of our findings in this report, we analyzed the GAO cases in peacetime 
environments and contingency environments to determine if there is a pattern of the 
violations reported. Combined with the results of the DoDIG Report (2010) report of the 
number of potential ADA violations under investigation, the expectation is that the 
number of ADA cases related to the GWOT will increase, as further investigations exist. 
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The following analyses are a summary of GAO reports on contracting issues in Tables 3 
and 4. In Table 5, we analyze those cases in a contingency environment. 
1. GAO Cases 2005–2012 Analysis 
The ADA is the principal statute that addresses the amount characteristic under 
31 U.S.C. § 1341, Limitations on Expending and Obligating Amount; 31 U.S.C. § 1342, 
Limitations on Voluntary Services; and 31 U.S.C. § 1517, Prohibited Obligations and 
Expenditures. Amount Statute violations, or 31 U.S.C. § 1341, Limitations on Expending 
and Obligating Amount, is incurring an obligation in advance of an appropriation, unless 
authorized by law. Violations, or 31 U.S.C. § 1517, Prohibited Obligations and 
Expenditures, is an amount constraint requiring that agencies may not make or authorize 
an expenditure or obligation exceeding an apportionment or other formal administrative 
subdivision of funds or incurring an obligation in advance of an appropriation, unless 
authorized by law.  
Other violations include an amount violation under 31 U.S.C. § 1342, Limitations 
on Voluntary Services, accepting voluntary services, unless otherwise authorized by law. 
The violation under 31 U.S.C. § 1502, Balances Available, is the Bona Fide Needs Rule 
time constraint. Obligating current year funds for future year needs is a violation of the 
Bona Fide Needs Rule and the Time Statute. An agency can also violate the ADA 
because funds in the proper account are unavailable at the time of obligation to correct 
the erroneous obligation.   
Only three ADA violations also included a violation of 31 U.S.C. § 1301, Purpose 
Statute, which states, “Appropriations shall be applied only to the objects for which the 
appropriations were made”  One other violation of 31 U.S.C. § 3302 involved depositing 
reimbursements into the O&M account rather than the general fund of the Treasury, as 
required by the Miscellaneous Receipts Statute. Under the violation of 31 U.S.C. § 1553, 




Table 3.   GAO Reported ADA Violations by Violation Type, 2005–2012 
 
The dollar amount of the reported ADA violations for the years 2005 through 
2012 totaled over $9.8 billion, with the 2009 reporting the largest amount at nearly  
$2.27 billion, or 23%, averaging $151 million. The year 2007 is the highest number of 
violations: 27 violations totaling $2.167 billion, averaging $80 million. In 2011, average 
violations totaled $86.7 million with 23 violations reported, totaling $1.99 billion. Such 
clauses are prima facie violations of the ADA because they constitute open-ended 
obligations of the government, even without the filing of liability claims under the 
agreement. 
The largest amount ADA violation reported was $1,636,619,522. This violation, 
reported by NASA Space Flight Capabilities, affected 11 accounts. In FY2007, NASA 
reported a 31 U.S.C. § 1517, Prohibited Obligations and Expenditures violation for 
FY2004 to March 2006 for $30,400,000. NASA did not seek reapportionment of funds 
transferred to the Space Flight Capabilities Account, resulting in obligations in excess of 
31 U.S.C. § Amount Amount &  Time Purpose & Amount Total by Violation % of Total
1341 97,241,752.97$        97,241,752.97$        0.99%
1342 6,500,000.00$          6,500,000.00$           0.07%
1517 2,118,809,857.22$ 2,118,809,857.22$  21.56%
1301 &
1341(a) 19,337.04$                   19,337.04$                 0.00%
1301(a) &
1517 388,838.09$                388,838.09$              0.00%
1301(a) &
1517(a)(1) 320,000.00$                320,000.00$              0.00%
1341(a) 1,830,707,668.02$ 1,830,707,668.02$  18.63%
1341(a) &
1502(a) 87,492.00$           87,492.00$                 0.00%
1341(a) &
1517 181,481.64$              181,481.64$              0.00%
1341(a) &
1517(a)(2) 524,546.00$              524,546.00$              0.01%
1341(a)(1) 45,052,221.58$        45,052,221.58$        0.46%
1341(a)(1)(A) 2,430,460,841.05$ 2,430,460,841.05$  24.73%
1341(a)(1)(A) & 
1342 68,849.29$                68,849.29$                 0.00%
1341(a)(1)(A) &
1517(a) 3,275,587.87$          3,275,587.87$           0.03%
1341(a)(1)(A) &
1517(a)(2) 23,316,321.31$        23,316,321.31$        0.24%
1341(a)(1)(B) 820,802,671.79$      820,802,671.79$      8.35%
1341(a)(1)(B) &
1517(a) 16,403,711.68$        16,403,711.68$        0.17%
1517(a) 448,559,562.07$      448,559,562.07$      4.56%
1517(a)(1) 1,455,202,073.44$ 1,455,202,073.44$  14.81%
1517(a)(1) &
1342 30,220.00$                30,220.00$                 0.00%
1517(a)(1) &
1553 39,733,571.00$        39,733,571.00$        0.40%
1517(a)(2) 480,163,646.49$      480,163,646.49$      4.89%
1517(a)(2) &
1341(a) 8,215,989.00$          8,215,989.00$           0.08%
1517(a)(2) &
3302(b) 285,987.00$              285,987.00$              0.00%
1517(b) 264,016.16$              264,016.16$              0.00%
Total by Constraint Type 9,825,800,575.58$  87,492.00$           728,175.13$                9,826,616,242.71$  100.00%
 54 
the Space Flight Capabilities apportionment. In FY2005, NASA was in violation, again, 
of 31 U.S.C. § 1517, Prohibited Obligations and Expenditures, for $1,636,619,522, when 
obligations in excess of 11 affected accounts for the estimated unobligated balances 
carried in FY2005.   
Table 4 is an analysis shows the number of violations, total for each year, the 
percentage of that year is total to the population of violations analyzed and the average 
ADA violation amount GAO report between 2005 and 2012. Averages vary year to year, 
clearly a phenomenon due to the variance in the size of the contracts, the agency, and the 
year of actual reporting of the incident. The average violation is over $58.8 million. The 
actual incidents, for the majority of the cases, occur several years before issuance of the 
ADA report. A violations of 31 U.S.C. § 1517, Prohibited Obligations and Expenditures, 
is an amount constraint whereby agencies may not make or authorize an expenditure or 
obligation exceeding an apportionment or other formal administrative subdivision of 
funds or incurring an obligation in advance of an appropriation, unless authorized by law. 
In these cases, NASA performed an account adjustment to reconcile and balance the 
Space Flight Capabilities account, and the excess obligations corrected by subsequent 
apportionments (GAO ADA Report, FY2007). 
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Table 4.   Average Amount GAO Reported ADA Violation 2005–2012 Analysis 
 
These reported violations include all agencies and all types of government 
environments, including CONUS and OCONUS. Seven violations explicitly identified 
related to contingency environments; others might have been. Because of the time lag 
associated with investigating and reporting ADA violations, there could be others. 
Table 5 is a list of the violations between 2005 and 2012 related to contingency 
type environments. The majority of these incidents violated 31 USC § 1341(a), 
Limitations on Expending and Obligating Amount, whereby the officer or employee of 
the USG made or authorized an expenditure or obligation in excess of and the amount 
available in the appropriation or fund for the expenditure or obligation. The remaining 
two incidents violated 31 USC § 1571(a) whereby the officer or employee of the USG 
made or authorized an expenditure or obligation exceeding the apportionment; or the 
Year # of Violations Total $ by Year  % of Total Average $ by Year
2005 20 1,333,459,890$       13.57% 66,672,994$               
2006 23 334,268,142$           3.40% 14,533,397$               
2007 27 2,167,521,226$       22.06% 80,278,564$               
2008 23 262,073,170$           2.67% 11,394,486$               
2009 15 2,266,466,380$       23.06% 151,097,759$             
2010 16 178,348,891$           1.81% 11,146,806$               
2011 23 1,994,531,987$       20.30% 86,718,782$               
2012 20 1,289,946,558$       13.13% 64,497,328$               










2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Average Amount GAO Reported ADA Violations 2005-2012
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amount permitted by regulation. Therefore, in all cases, insufficient funding was 
available at the time of the expenditure or obligation. 
Table 5.   GAO Reported ADA Violations in Contingency Environments, 2005–2012 
 
 
Some of these cases (GAO, 2005–2012) will be analyzed by the authors in this 
paper further to understand the background of the violations and the constraints fiscal 
laws have placed on those attempting to meet urgent contingency mission needs. 
2. Camp Bucca, Iraq, Internment Facility  
Camp Bucca was located near the town of Umm Quasar, near the Iraq-Kuwait 
border. The camp hosted soldiers from multiple branches of the U.S. military and 
Coalition forces. The LOGCAP program is a Services contract allowing O&M funds to 
fund minor. These funds are limited to $750,000 today, unless the construction is to 
correct conditions that present a threat to life, health, and safety, when the O&M 
threshold is $1.5 million. The Camp Bucca construction project clearly exceeded those 
thresholds.   
The LOGCAP contractor’s requirement was an extensive construction and 
expansion mission. Early projects included the construction of 20 LSAs, a  shower 




# Agency Description ADA Violation  Amount 
National Disaster 12-08 EPA Oil Spill Response 31 USC §1341(a)(1)(A) 502,215.00$         
GWOT Response 12-10 JIEDDO
Construct counter-IED testing 
facility 31 USC §1341(a)(1)(A) 13,750,000.00$     
Foreign Disaster 12-12 DoA Haiti Relief Operations 31 USC §1571(a)(1) 1,571,793.94$      
GWOT Response 09-01 DoA Camp Bucca 31 USC §1571(a) 16,802,792.00$     
National Disaster 07-12 DoA
Hurricane Support & Relief in the 
Virgin Islands 31 USC § 1341(a) 11,806,993.00$     
GWOT Response 07-14 DoA
Bonus' soldiers deployed to Afghan. 
Iraq and Kuwait 31 USC § 1341(a) 30,000.00$           
GWOT Response 05-14 DoNavy Rapid mobilization following 9/11 31 USC § 1341(a) 21,800,000.00$     
TOTAL 66,263,793.94$ 
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12 recreational areas inside the internment facility. In July 2006, the Army’s Inspector 
General investigated the building of the internment facility located in Camp Bucca, Iraq, 
under the LOGCAP III contract. The report concluded in January 2007 that “Army 
personnel associated with funding of Phases I and II construction did not implement 
sufficient controls to ensure military compliance with applicable laws and regulations 
resulting in two ADA violations with the FY 2004 Army O&M appropriation” (Bowen, 
2007).  “Third United States Army, U.S. Army Central Command improperly obligated 
FY 2004 O&M funds for the construction of two phases of an internment facility at 
Camp Bucca, Iraq. The Command should have obligated the FY 2004 Military 
Construction, Army appropriation. A violation of 31 U.S.C. § 1517(a), Prohibited 
Obligations and Expenditures, occurred when no appropriations were available to cover 
the obligations. The Command could not obligate O&M appropriations under 10 U.S.C. § 
2805, Unspecified Minor Construction, because the obligated amount exceeded the 
statute’s obligation amount limitation. Neither could the Command utilize authority 
provided in the National Defense Authorization Act that authorizes O&M appropriations 
for construction outside the U.S. under certain conditions because the Secretary of 
Defense did not make the requisite determination that the conditions were present” 
(GAO, 2009;  GAO, 2005–2012). 
According to the GAO, The Deputy Secretary of Defense outlined what a project 
would need to meet each of the following conditions to use O&M in the Camp Bucca, 
Iraq case (this case met all but the last criteria): 
• Necessary to meet urgent military operational requirements of a 
temporary nature involving the use of the Armed Forces in support 
of a declaration of war, the declaration by the President of a 
national emergency under section 201 of the National Emergencies 
Act, or a contingency operation. 
• Construction is not carried out on a military installation where the 
U.S. is reasonably expected to have a long-term presence.  
• The U.S. has no intention of using the construction after the 
operational requirements have been satisfied. 
• The level of construction is the minimum necessary to meet the 
temporary operational requirements. Notification of obligation of 
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funds: Within seven days after the date on which appropriated 
funds available for O&M are first obligated for a construction 
project under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall submit 
to the congressional committee notice of the obligation of funds 
and the construction project. (GAO, 2009; GAO, 2005–2012). 
 
If LOGCAP determined that the program was able to use the O&M funding for all 
of the conditions listed, the division would have needed to follow the notification of 
obligation of funds condition, which they did not.   
3. Domestic and Foreign Man-made or Natural Disasters and 
Emergencies 
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) reported an ADA violation of 
31 U.S.C. 1341(a) (1) (A), Limitations on Expending and Obligating Amount, in its Oil 
Spill Response Account for $502,215. The violations occurred in November 2010, when 
the EPA exceeded the funds available in the account. The EPA was participating in the 
response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill while at the same time responding to a major 
inland oil spill in Enbridge, Michigan. The EPA is able to disburse funds from its Oil 
Spill Response Account for its response activities in the inland zone. Sources of funds are 
resources appropriated to the EPA as advances and reimbursements under an ongoing 
interagency agreement or incident-specific Pollution Removal Funding Agreement. 
When the EPA expends its own appropriations, the agency may reimburse the EPA with 
funds available from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund under the Oil Pollution Act. The 
EPA expended more than the available cash balance in the Oil Spill Response Account.   
The EPA’s ADA violation was the result of an inadvertent report error. The EPA 
also noted that the limited available funding to the EPA under the FY2011 continuing 
resolutions—as well as delays in reimbursement, the lack of additional cash advances 
from the agency, and the unusual amount of funding requirement for the Deep Horizon 
and Enbridge oil spills—created a unique set of circumstances, causing the account to fall 
to a critically low level. The lack of cash advances and the unusual amount of funding 
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requirement increased the fiscal law challenges incurred by the EPA during the execution 
in response to these disasters.   
Per the definition of contingency (i.e., “not certain to occur,” “something liable to 
happen as an adjunct to or result of else,” “happening by chance or unforeseen causes”), 
these natural disasters will be a challenge to fund without prior knowledge of the 
complete requirements to define the costs. In this situation, multiple disasters 
complicated the matter further, along with improper controls to monitor the funding. The 
EPA has created a new policy was established to ensure that the funds are received from 
the paying agency to avoid an excess obligation or expenditure. Until the EPA receives 
reimbursements or an advance from the paying agency to replenish the account, the 
appropriation cannot continue to disburse funds in the event that the cash balance falls 
below $500,000. Despite the controls put into place, delays may still exist.  
4. Marine Military Personnel Mobilization Antideficiency Act Violation, 
Case 03-10  
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, a national emergency as defined 
under contingency operations was set up. The Marine Corps authorized during FY2002  
7,500 reservists to mobilize. Due to the complexities associated with the increased 
workload of mobilizing thousands of reservists and no accurate process for tracking 
costs, the Marine Corps made over-disbursements from the Military Personnel, Marine 
Corps appropriation until July 2003, totaling $21.8 million. The act of over-disbursing 
violated 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a), Limitations on Expending and Obligating Amount, or the 
Amount Statute constraint. In August 2003 when $27 million of DERFs provided to 
cover the Marine mobilization costs to correct the violation. The Navy also implemented 
procedures to preclude a reoccurrence of this type of violation. This violation was not 
included in the totals in Table 3 and Table 4, reported prior to 2005. 
B. MILITARY CONSTRUCTION CASES 
Construction projects that exceed $1.5 million in value require specific approval 
by Congress. MILCON projects generally take a minimum of six to nine months (for 
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reprogramming approvals) and two years for authorization and appropriation by 
Congress. These time delays impede the accomplishment of urgent missions.   
Hughes (2005) used the following example: “A commander requires the 
establishment of a base camp in a foreign country. The base camp will be used for an 
indeterminate duration, but certain facilities such as a perimeter fence and a command 
and control bunker are required immediately. Other facilities, such a helipad and a motor 
pool, would be welcome, but are not strictly necessary” (p. 7). 
According to Hughes (2005), “the command could not scope the project to fund 
the perimeter fence separately from the command and control bunker. The command 
would not build the fence, but for the necessity of protecting the bunker, and the 
command would not build the bunker, but for the protection offered by the security fence. 
Based on these facts, the two projects are interdependent” (p. 7). Total costs for an 
interdependent for this project is an example a single project. An analysis determines if 
costs are within the $750,000 O&M threshold. If the costs are not within the threshold 
range, the process begins with reporting and notification to Congress to appropriate 
MILCON funds. These actions are particularly burdensome to the command that needs 
the fence and bunker to protect the warfighter. Timing is a critical constraint in this 
situation. 
According to Hughes (2005), the SJA should determine the following when 
analyzing the scope of the requirement 
1. “What components are necessary to meet the mission’s requirements and 
fulfill the commander’s intent? 
2. [Are] the individual components...interdependent or merely interrelated?” 
(Hughes, 2005, p. 7). 
Scoping a project and including all of the MILCON work necessary to produce a 
complete and usable facility also prevents illegal incrementation, or what Congress has 
defined as “the foot in the door technique” (Hughes, 2005; H.R. Rep. No. 87-1858, 
1962). These are cases where new and unanticipated requirements for a minor project 
will become apparent, requiring additional funds to be necessary to protect or enhance an 
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already large investment that is not yet fully complete. Many times, unanticipated 
requirements contain known areas of scope, but excluded, from the project costs, 
knowing that the project would not fit within the legal thresholds. When facing the fiscal 
law constraints to obtain the appropriate color of funding, the commander gets “the foot 
in the door” to start the project and then continues to increase costs to get all of the scope 
that was originally intended. This may be a potential case of project splitting if the 
projects are determined to be interdependent.   
As reflected in Appendix H, the DODIG reported areas of fraud under “Pre-
Award Requirements,” project splitting is an issue that use Simplified Acquisition 
Procedures as a mechanism to work around the processes of review and approval 
(DODIG, 2010, p. 38).  
The SJA will also review the costs of the project to determine the application of 
payment of costs from the appropriation designated for the project. These costs include 
materials, supplies, civilian or contract labor, and services applicable to the project. 
Review of different appropriations available to fund any unfunded costs.  (e.g., military 
labor applied to Military Personnel Appropriations). Many times, a way to reduce the 
costs of a project is to use military labor, described as organically, or the FSS for 
materials.  
C. LOGCAP CASE ANALYSIS 
As a part of the John Warner NDAA for FY2007, Congress added Section 2333 
to Title 10 of the U.S. Code requiring the Secretary of Defense to “develop joint policies 
for requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency 
contracting during combat operations and post-conflict operations” (John Warner 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, 2006). As part  of the develop 
of these missions, the full life cycle costs are to be determined by reviewing the research, 
development, testing and evaluation, procurement, MILCON, and O&M costs. The basic 
LOGCAP IV contract uses various types and combinations of contracts types. The 
following cases all describe fiscal law constraints that affected LOGCAP contracts. 
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1. Incremental Funding 
The timeliness of the incremental funding is crucial to avoid a potential violation 
of the Amount Statute. The contracting officer must receive the funding source document 
and place on contract prior to spending of the funds. Without this action, this can impose 
risks to both the contractor and the government for potential stop work conditions, 
demobilization costs, remobilization costs, and increase in administrative costs.   
Incremental funding, when used for large service contracts, accounts for costs in 
the billions of dollars and must be monitored and analyzed. Burn rates for estimated costs 
to complete and the estimated budget on the task order determines the amount of funding. 
Attempts to identify large fluctuations of costs include the use of impact study reports, 
cost variance reports, and correlation to work load drivers. However, this process occurs 
after invoicing and payment. This process is very complex and poses a high risk for fiscal 
law violations. 
Due to the DCAA audit backlog, Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audits 
incurred costs years later. These audits will identify any unsupported, unallowable, 
unallocable, and/or inapplicable costs. These types of costs identified by DCAA are 
potential violations of the Purpose Statute, whereby funding is obligated for purposes 
other than what was authorized. 
As contract specialists in LOGCAP and Reachback divisions, we are aware of the 
administrative burden and risk that incremental funding has placed on the contracting 
areas and support staff, who must prepare and review multiple modifications to task 
orders. Some funds are so small that that may only cover as little as less than one day of 
contract service. Risk falls on both the contractor and the government for potential stop 
work conditions, demobilization costs, remobilization costs, and increase in 
administrative costs. Appendix J reports that financial management of funds is an issue in 
nine audits with potential ADA violations and Funding/Obligations problem areas under 
Financial Management. Contractors and suppliers report untimely payments indicating 
possible fraudulent manipulations and diversions of government resources through 
finance or supply operations (DODIG, 2012). As of March 2012, the Defense Criminal 
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Investigation Service has 249 ongoing investigations primarily pertaining to Overseas 
Contingency Contracting involving public corruption, procurement fraud and theft and 
technology protection (DoDIG, 2012).   
2. Facility Construction under LOGCAP III  
In July 2003, the Combined Forces Land Component Commander extended the 
deployment of most U.S. forces in Iraq until February 2004. The Combined Forces Land 
Component Commander also ordered its subordinate commands to move Soldiers out of 
tents and into adequate temporary billeting to provide better comfort. To accomplish the 
mission, the 101st Airborne Division, based in Mosul, Iraq, considered three alternative 
courses of action:   
1. Using engineering brigades to build its own housing by purchasing 
construction materials, known as an organic approach. This estimated cost 
would be nearly $25 million for complete and usable facilities. However, 
this required MILCON funds, which were not available. 
2. Dividing the entire housing requirement into 33 separate, smaller projects 
with separate costs less than $750,000. All of the projects were then below 
the statutory threshold and thus permitted O&M funding. The SJA would 
reject this approach as project splitting. 
3. Re-evaluate the mission to down-scope the project, and use LOGCAP to 
provide billeting by bringing in relocatable buildings (RLBs). Total costs 
came to about $65 million, plus $8 million in potential administrative and 
award fee costs (Hughes, 2005). 
LOGCAP III was an IDIQ contract with Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR). KBR 
provided the military with comprehensive logistics, engineering, and construction support 
during a deployment anywhere in the world. Under the contract, KBR’s terms include 
providing services, such as billeting or dining facility (DFAC) support services, and then 
build the facilities required to perform that service. An example is when the contractor 
charges for costs for the facility as part of the contractor’s direct costs.  with the 
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additional building added to the government’s property list, the contractor begins 
maintenance on the building.  “Funneling construction through LOGCAP, therefore, 
allowed the Army to accomplish indirectly what fiscal laws prohibited it from doing 
directly. Until the demise of the Reres Doctrine, units in Iraq took full advantage of the 
LOGCAP loophole” (Hughes, 2005, p. 21).    
In December 2004, the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF–I) had decided that 
there was no LOGCAP exception to buying construction services, especially when there 
were no services contemplated other than the construction itself.  
The Army Field Support Command issued guidance that created an analytical 
framework for SJAs to determine whether LOGCAP III contract is a legitimate source to 
obtain construction services with O&M funding. As a resolve, construction is now 
included in the statement of work (SOW). The use of O&M funds is applicable if the 
construction costs fell within the thresholds. Otherwise, MILCON funds are the proper 
source.  
3. Construction Timing Case  
A more complex case occurs when, post-award, the field command has a 
requirement for construction and provides direction after completing the change 
management process identified in the MAAWS-A (USFOR-A, 2012). Appendix B 
identifies the lengthy and complex process for funding a construction requirement.   
Under a LOGCAP scenario, if DFAC services are required, the contractor 
proposes to meet the requirement by serving meals in the contractor’s own tents. If 
reasonably foreseeable construction of more substantial facilities will eventually be 
necessary, then the command should not accept the proposal because this would be a 
work-around to fiscal constraints. Thus, the DFAC would be under construction 
guidelines, and not merely services. The process is to separate the construction costs from 
the O&M support service costs before determining the proper appropriation to use to 
fund the work. If the mission has anticipated duration is short, on the other hand, then the 
proposal might be acceptable. If the forward operating base (FOB) duration is longer, and 
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tents no longer meet mission requirements, then the program pursues normal construction 
funding channels to build a new DFAC.   
“Here, performance with construction was not reasonably necessary, and the 
contractor did not propose construction, but after award, someone within the Government 
directed the contractor [through the Change Order process2] to engage in construction 
activities. This direction by the Government to choose construction as a means for 
continued contract performance, rather than simply the contractor choosing construction 
as a means of performance, makes the activity a military construction project” (Hughes, 
2005, p. 22). 
4. Base Camp Expansion Example  
In a similar example, a requirements generator contacted the LOGCAP division to 
expand a 500-man base to a 1000-man base with pre-designed temporary housing 
facilities occupied by the Army and the Air Force in an AOR that LOGCAP was not 
currently serving. The Army led the project with some funding provided by the Air 
Force. The requirements generator proposed to change the initial DFAC and place a 
second DFAC in a temporary structure capable of accommodating a 28-day meal cycle 
for food services 24 hours, seven days a week. This task involved a remodel of the 
existing DFAC, bringing in larger stoves, refrigeration units, utensils, etc., with estimates 
exceeding the $750,000 threshold. The proposed requirement from the field included the 
additional housing for the Army and Air Force. The question is whether the housing for 
the contractor would be within the confines of the AOR or on the economy. The proposed 
requirement from the field also included an athletic facility for the Soldiers and office 
space for administrative functions.    
                                                 
2 In response to the command’s requirements documented in the SOW, the LOGCAP contractor 
develops and submits a proposed rough order of magnitude (ROM) cost estimate or technical execution 
plan (TEP) for approval. U.S. Army Materiel Command, AMC PAM. 700-30, LOGCAP 19 (2000). Under 
this analysis, if the contractor proposes to meet the SOW’s requirements by charging the command for a 
construction project, then the purpose of those funds is construction, and MILCON funding rules must be 
followed (Hughes, 2005, p. 22). 
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The fiscal law concern is whether the proposed requirement is (1) an upgrade of 
the existing base with separate components that would be separate requirements or (2) 
requirements that are interrelated and constitute a single undertaking. Further 
complicating the contract requirements included upgrades to the DFAC or a decision for 
a second DFAC and whether the second DFAC was primarily benefitting the Army or the 
Air Force. In addition, if a second DFAC was constructed but it shared refrigeration units 
with the first, does it constitute a second construction project or an upgrade to the first? 
What appeared to be a simple project turned out to be complex?  These 
considerations—coupled with two Services and multiple SJA opinions—frustrated all of 
the key players, and ultimately, the requirements generator canceled the project.   
In this scenario, the responsible parties may be in violation of several fiscal laws. 
The commands had an urgent request, and O&M funds would be optimal. However, the 
costs of remodeling a DFAC and building a second DFAC would exceed the $750,000 
threshold, requiring MILCON funding. Attempting to segregate the DFACs locating the 
facilities on separate sides of the base, using O&M funds, may be a violation of the 
Amount Statute, using the inappropriate color of money depending on whether the need 
facilitated the necessity of two separate DFACs compared to remodeling the existing 
DFAC to accommodate a larger number of users. 
The athletic facility was not interdependent, treated as a separate requirement, 
which would not violate the amount constraint. However, SJAs may contend that the 
DFAC, athletic facility, and billeting is for one purpose—the creation of a forward 
operating base—and should be considered one project with all costs included. The costs 
of the new base, using O&M funds, would exceed the threshold and violate the Purpose 
and Amount Statutes.  
5. Relocatable Building Funding Case 
Construction and Base Camp Development in the USCENTCOM Area of 
Responsibility (Headquarters, CENTCOM, 2013), known in the military as the Sand 
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Book, stated that CENTCOM will establish non-permanent construction standards for 
contingency base camps and airfields (Headquarters CENTCOM, 2013, p. 5-1).   
Contingency construction standards apply to locations where no camp 
infrastructure exist, where existing support infrastructure does not meet 
force increases, or other requirements levied by missions or as an interim 
measure in support of building permanent infrastructure to support. 
(Headquarters CENTCOM, 2013, p. 5-1).   
The Sand Book characterizes non-permanent contingency construction as initial, 
temporary, or semi-permanent. Initial construction requires minimal engineering effort 
for immediate use upon arrival for a limited time, ranging up to 6 months, and durable 
replacement of temporary facilities during the course of operation. Examples of an initial 
construction would be tent-type structures. Temporary structures are intended for use up 
to two years but may be used indefinitely and are characterized by “austere facilities 
requiring additional engineering efforts which improve the durability, morale, safety and 
health standards of personnel” (Headquarters, CENTCOM, 2013, p. 5-2), including 
lighting, power systems, generator loads, and alternative energy sources.  “Requirements 
for sustainable design and development do not apply” (Headquarters, CENTCOM, 2013, 
p. 5-4).   
RLBs must be obtained in accordance with DoD I 4165.56 (Estevez, 2013), which 
limits the lease period to no more than three years. The idea behind this limitation is that 
the building is an interim facility pending the availability of permanent space in existing 
facilities or the construction of a permanent conventional facility. Options include 
organic RLBs obtained through FSS and not included in the O&M costs, using 
procurement funds, or purchased or leased by the contractor through the augmentation 
clauses within LOGCAP by the contractor using O&M funds. It would appear that many 
options are available, and the needs of the military in the contingency environment would 
dictate the most efficient course of action.   
Violating fiscal law is possible when the need exceeds the thresholds put in place 
by the constraints of current fiscal laws. The practice of citing the wrong funds, other 
than what is regulated, for the facilities, or construction of a more permanent facility for a 
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short-term, interim facility will invoke a violation of the Amount Statute and the Purpose 
Statute. An example case describes an RLB that was close to completion by the Army 
when Special Forces (the occupants) realized that the internal wiring did not meet their 
needs. The Air Force engineers were working with the Army in a joint environment, and 
confusion existed over immediate correction of the deficiency for the RLB. According to 
Department of the Air Force Engineering Technical Letter (2002), newly constructed 
facilities cannot be modified within 12 months of the beneficial occupancy date unless 
the modification is necessary by a mission or an equipment change that was unforeseen 
prior to the occupancy date (Cook, 2002). The Army did not have a similar restriction. 
The electrical modifications project completed of under Army regulations guidelines 
(DoD Appropriation Act, 2007). Had the incident been an Air Force project, it 
modifications would have not been made.   
Regulations between the branches are not consistent, causing confusion and 
resulting in delays. In Appendix G, the OSD, Organizational, and Management Planning 
identified the multitude organizations and application funding for each, which increases 
the complication of working with other organizations, having different regulations, which 
differ for requirements and the use of funds (DoDIG, 2010). 
An RLB may be in the form of a building such as one that is may be transported, 
removed or a trailer-type Containerized Housing Unit, otherwise known as a CHU. 
According to DA PAM 420-11, Facilities engineering: Project definition and work 
classification, at least 80% of the original project costs must be capable of removal from 
the site (Department of the Army, 2010). The military refers to this as the “80/20 rule” in 
construction. There is a desire to use cement in and around the building, but it is 
expensive in the region and impedes on the 20% of the total costs, resulting in a possible 
reclassification of the structure as permanent. If the total costs to remove the structure 
exceed the $750,000 O&M threshold, it is a violation of the Amount Statute.   
In longer-term contingency operations, tenants of RLBs often demand extensive 
alterations to these units to make it more similar to a permanent facility, including things 
like air conditioning units and decks. If the facility contains decks and stairways bolted to 
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the structure, the structure is temporary minor construction and falls under the $750,000 
construction threshold. However, welded decks and stairways to the units become 
permanent requiring the use of MILCON funds. Such modifications also affect the 80/20 
rule.   
6. Repairs and Maintenance Case   
Repairs and maintenance (R&M) to facilities prevent deterioration to preserve the 
facility so that it is usable for its designated purpose. Repairs may include overhauling, 
reprocessing, or replacing parts or materials that have deteriorated due to normal wear 
and tear and not corrected through maintenance (DPAP, 2012). If there is a combination 
in a project, the project estimate lists each type of work and itemization of separate funds, 
as either O&M- or MILCON-type costs. MILCON funding is required when the work is 
so complex and integrate that the separation is difficult. 
Under LOGCAP IV, contractors conducted technical inspections, completed 
repairs to bring facilities to safe standards, and added to the Government’s property list. 
Determining the type of funding may be difficult if the building has a history of several 
types of uses. One commander may determine that the work is R&M and not construction 
(O&M), while another may view it as a major change to the structure and construction 
(MILCON).   
7. Life, Health, and Safety Funding Case 
Resolution of construction-related conditions that present a threat to life, health, 
and safety uses O&M funds, up to a $1.5 million threshold. Emergency and 
Extraordinary Expense Funds are used for smaller, unanticipated, short-notice 
construction projects. Emergency and extraordinary expense funds are limited to 
$500,000 without notification to the Secretary of Defense and the appropriate 
congressional committees. The President may also direct the Secretary of Defense to 
provide foreign disaster assistance in an effort to prevent the loss of life outside the U.S. 
in response to man-made or natural disasters.  
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CENTCOM regulation 415-1 states that O&M funds will be used to the maximum 
extent possible. The combined/joint task force and service component with 
contingency/wartime construction management authority receives prioritized submissions 
of Construction requirements that exceed organic capability and/or the new construction 
O&M thresholds (Headquarters CENTCOM, 2013, p. 7-1).    
After the 2008 death of a Soldier in Iraq from electrocution, a discovery of 
widespread electrical problems existed in several buildings. The cost to replace the faulty 
electrical system in the facilities and through the FOB exceeded the $750,000 threshold. 
Considered as a serious safety problem requiring immediate attention, the military was 
able to use of the life, health, and safety exception threshold of up to $1.5 million 
(Gamache, 2009). 
In some cases, commanders requested conversion and updates from tents to RLBs 
on FOBs using the O&M life, health, and safety exception when costs exceeded the 
$750,000 threshold, stating that the upgrade offered greater protection from the elements 
and from action by hostile forces. However, such a rationale did not meet congressional 
intent for the use of the life, health, and safety exception (Gamache, 2009).   
8. Haiti Case 
The military needs to be able to respond on short notice. In Haiti, the LOGCAP 
division received a requirement for housing and sustaining 20,000 troops in five base 
camps for 180 days. The contract required KBR to receive and support 1,300 troops per 
day within 15 days of notification of the deployment. Within 30 days, KBR was required 
to support 20,000 troops in one rear and four forward base camps for up to 180 days, with 
options to increase the size of the supported force to 50,000 troops and to extend support 
to 360 days. The contract provisions called for base life support, which includes billeting, 
DFACs, potable water, sanitation, showers, laundry, transportation, utilities and other 
logistical support, construction support, general logistics services, augmentation to 
engineer units, and facility engineer support.   
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Growth in the mission could easily lead to violations of the Purpose Statute and 
Amount Statute for O&M funding. Time constraints on funding could also be an issue if 
it were later determined that needs arose in one fiscal year and satisfied from different 
fiscal year funds. Contingency situations like in this Haiti example, where the 
requirement continues to increase, places a burden on the decision-makers to ensure that 
sufficient funds are available prior to the obligation to avoid violations of fiscal law. 
9. Lease-Versus-Buy Procurements 
Equipment purchases over specific dollar thresholds require the use of Other 
Procurement Army (OPA) funds instead of O&M funds. These thresholds can impede 
efficient business practices. Equipment needed to support contingency environments 
includes things such as generators, vehicles, cranes, and construction-type equipment. 
The absence of OPA funds under LOGCAP to support the acquisition of certain types of 
equipment forces the contractor to lease the equipment. The costs for leasing the 
equipment may contain substantial risk premiums to cover the possibility of loss or 
damage. The lease arrangements also need to match the period of performance, which 
may require an additional cost. Often a lease-versus-buy analysis supports the case for 
purchasing, but funding limitations dictate leasing as the only option. Purchasing the 
equipment using O&M funds under LOGCAP would be a violation of the ADA using 
improper funds.   
USFOR-A determined that military units were leasing about 3,000 vehicles at an 
annual cost of $119 million using O&M funding. USFOR-A would have preferred to 
purchase the vehicles but did not have access to procurement funds. The leases obtained 
through hundreds of small-dollar annual lease agreements and not through a central 
source for leasing, management, or maintaining vehicles. The Afghanistan vendors were 
charging “exorbitant” lease rates for the vehicles, which were picking up 80% of the 
procurement cost during the first lease year. USFOR-A, with the General Services 
Administration (GSA),  implemented a vehicle lease program with the ability to maintain 
1,000 vehicles for about $19 million a year with a program fully in place by November 
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2011 (USFOR-A, 2013). If the equipment was altered (e.g., added protective armor), it 
must be restored to the original condition prior to return under the lease agreement.   
10. LOGCAP Work Order Funding 
In contingency environments, military construction repairs can be so small as to 
account for less than one hour of labor. Such changes to the task orders are administrative 
burdens to the contracting office accounting for numerous, small, undefinitized change 
orders, and the cost of the administrative time and paperwork greatly exceeds the actual 
cost to perform the task. LOGCAP and DCMA reviewed these transactions to derive an 
annual total estimated number and average amount for each change order. Using those 
data, task order modifications included incorporated performance work statement (PWS) 
revisions into work orders. As such, the contracting team implemented a multimillion 
dollar; full-performance total budget equal to a specific number of work orders and the 
administrative contracting officer (ACO) is the responsible party to authorize tasks under 
the work orders. The implementation of these PWS revisions has saved hundreds of hours 
of administrative work for both the Government and the contractor.   
Some SJAs may contend that the funds were obligated prior to the need identified, 
which would be in violation of the Time Statute and the Bona Fide Needs Rule. The 
violation of the Amount Statute exists when insufficient funds or over-obligated funds 
exist on a contract, Without proper oversight, Purpose Statute is in violation, if the work 
orders create a situation that splits a large construction project into small amount, which 
would have required MILCON funding.    
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
The analysis shows that despite the explicit instructions provided within the 
MAAWS-A (USFOR-A, 2012), Principles of Federal Appropriations Law (GAO, 2012a), 
and other Government publications, the constraints of fiscal law—purpose, time, and 
amount—continue to exist and impede upon the completion of the mission. 
The DoD is a large and diverse organization operating in various environments, 
which does not allow, “one size fits all” acquisition solutions. The numerous military 
branches and Services each have separate sets of rules and processes. The Government 
continuously updates and revises each have separate sets of rules and processes on a 
regular basis, including but not limited to the FAR, DFARS, and DFARS Procedures, 
Guidance, and Information (PGI). When operating in a peacetime environment, it is 
easier to view and apply rules that require more timing, oversight, and analysis prior to 
the procurement of goods, services, and construction. These are routine functions within 
departments using fiscal laws and contracting regulations as authorized by Congress.   
For the past 10 years, the regular budget process does not include contingency 
operation funding has been designated as emergency spending and funded through 
supplemental appropriations. Distortion of the size of these budget submissions may 
happen by separating substantial proposed expenditures as subsequent supplemental 
submissions. The use of the supplemental budget also impedes on the transparency of the 
full cost of contracting, creating the illusion that contractors in contingency environments 
have an open checkbook to spend. Government contracting teams must procure the needs 
for contingency missions using the best value and best price practices and yet manage the 
risks to the government’s acquiring goods and services. Cost-reimbursement contracts 
add to the illusion of an open checkbook for the contractor when a larger portion of the 
risk of performance for payment is bore by the government rather than the contractor. 
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Validation of contractor costs through DCAA incurred cost audits are not timely, and 
contractor penalties become deferred to the future. 
We have identified different contingency environments and phases within those 
environments. These phases require different operational and funding needs. We have 
determined that the current operations in Southwest Asia (SWA) operate for a longer 
period, resulting in a long sustainment period. This increases the opportunities for new 
scenarios that challenge SJAs to stay within the constraints of fiscal law, as shown by the 
increased equipment lease costs and fraud and waste reported by the GAO, DoDIG and 
the CWC, 2011. The use of O&M funds for the leasing of vehicles and equipment has 
cost the government more money. The lack of procurement funds in contingency 
environments has led to these extra costs as evidenced by the lease-versus-buy analysis 
showing that the purchase of vehicles would be of better value for the government in the 
long term. 
Initial, rapid deployment of forces during mobilization stages may require large 
amounts of immediate funding. The Marine Corp example in Chapter IV shows the 
complexities associated with the increased workload of mobilizing thousands of 
reservists and no accurate process for tracking costs, Marine Military Personnel 
Mobilization Antideficiency Act Violation, Case 03-10. Sufficient funds were not 
available in the military personnel, Marine Corp appropriation.       
The risk of violating the Amount Statute laws increases in contingency 
environments, particularly those that involve natural and man-made disasters, as 
evidenced by the GAO’s ADA, such as the EPA’s oil spill response and Haiti response in 
Chapter IV, Domestic and Foreign Man-made or Natural Disasters and Emergencies. We 
have found that the 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a), Limitations on Expending and Obligating 
Amount, violations were real emergencies and contingencies requiring the rapid 
mobilization for storm support and oil spill response, as compared to a sustainment 
situation of construction to a FOB a few years into a war. The stress increases for the 
contracting officer to stay within the rules to avoid violation of fiscal laws.  
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After examining the military justification for the use of the Reres Doctrine, 
Congress admitted, “the statutorily-mandated military construction process is 
cumbersome and can be slow. Another complication is the lack of a dedicated source of 
funding for contingency construction needs” (Hughes, 2005). Congress also frankly 
acknowledged, “these problems impede timely response to urgent requirements of armed 
conflict” (Hughes, 2005). During Operation Desert Storm, Operation Enduring Freedom, 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the military struggled to fund necessary construction 
projects when MILCON funds were not available and the length of time to obtain the 
funds precluded the project to be finished rapidly.  
Congress acknowledged the impediment of the statutes, yet provided limited 
flexible resources for military construction. Their attempts through Emergency 
Construction (10 U.S.C. § 2803), Contingency Construction (10 U.S.C. § 2804), and 
Construction Authority in a National Emergency (10 U.S.C. § 2808) statutes require 
notifications to Congress, waiting periods, determination of estimated costs, and in some 
situations, reprogramming of funds from unobligated funds. However, these 
authorizations ignore, underfund, and do not resolve the ultimate needs within combat 
and contingency environments. Resolutions are available for construction-related 
conditions that present a risk to life, health, or safety paid for with O&M funds within the 
$1.5 million threshold. Emergency and Extra-ordinary Expense funds services for small, 
unanticipated, short-notice construction projects. However, such rationale did not meet 
congressional intent. 
The funding for military construction is complicated with the numerous military 
regulations for facilities and construction. Applying those regulations in a contingency 
environment has impeded contracting for requirements and imposed risks of potential 
violation of statutes. Personnel in the field struggle with the massive amount of changing 
requirements under urgent conditions requiring reviewing:   
• the analysis of requirements to separate construction efforts from O&M 
efforts,    
• the requirement scope appears to be the strongest challenge, and 
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• the interdependent or interrelated relationships of components of the 
project, to avoid project-splitting.  
Without the aggressive oversight and review, the SJA’s risk of potential fiscal law statute 
violation increases. 
The evidence of MILCON violations examined during the buildup and 
sustainment periods of wartime environments. The limitation on the use of O&M 
appropriations for MILCON to the $750,000 MILCON threshold has been a challenge for 
SJAs to work with—unless a life, health, or safety aspect to the requirement, when the 
threshold will increase to $1.5 million. Revisions to rules and definitions help define 
what construction is and is not. However, challenges increase as requirement generators 
want to interject opinions and stretch rules to meet the current “urgent” needs. Difficulty 
is recognizes when opinions or determinations from those requesting the requirement as 
to whether the needs may not be as urgent and become more of a gaming strategy. These 
strategies may be to avoid the lengthy delays of going through the military construction 
requirements for military appropriations or notifications to Congress under special 
appropriations; Non-permanent contingency construction has continued challenges. 
Additional rules, such as the 80/20 rule, help requirement generators determine the type 
of funds to use whether the structure is to be temporary or involve longer, permanent 
construction. Violation of fiscal laws is possible when the need exceeds the threshold put 
into place by the constraints of current fiscal laws. Citing the wrong funds for the 
structure, or if a more permanent facility is constructed than what is designated in the 
regulation for a short-term, interim facility will create a violation.  
Challenges increase when contracting professionals meet the needs of the military 
with a high reliance on SJAs and other legal professionals to validate the proper use of 
funds and when those particular types of funds require long lead-times to obtain or are 
not available.   
There are cases where a minor project will come to the point where new and 
unanticipated requirements for the project become apparent, require additional funds to 
be necessary to protect or enhance an already large investment that is not yet fully 
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complete. Knowing that the project would not fit within the legal thresholds, requirement 
generators do not include in probable known scope requirements, as unanticipated 
requirements. SJAs have a heavy task of analyzing requirements for the potential of 
project-splitting and incremental requirements by reviewing the interdependency and 
inter-relationship of projects. Interdependent projects use full funding as a single project. 
The concern with the fiscal law in place is whether the proposed requirement is an 
upgrade of the existing base with separate components that would be separate 
requirements, or requirements that are interrelated and constitute a single undertaking. 
The SJAs are also reviewing the project to avoid violation of the Purpose Statute 
when there is a combination in a project. The requirements generators much identify each 
type of work, request separate funding, and itemize in the project estimates. If the work is 
integrated, the separation is difficult, and the work is as MILCON, resulting in possibly 
delays and administrative burdens of congressional reporting. 
The multitude of programs make identification of correct regulations and funding 
sources difficult when engaging in a joint capability contingency mission, as described in 
the examples between the Army and Air Force. When the Air Force regulation did not fit 
the mold for the requirement, the Army used their regulations. No consistent system or 
coordination exists for all of the Services to document services, performance, and costs. 
These systems lack methods to assess sustainment needs and subsequent costs.   
The growth of a mission could easily lead to violations of the Purpose Statute and 
Amount Statute for O&M funding. Time constraints on funding could also be an issue; 
programs found that needs arose in one fiscal year and were satisfied from different fiscal 
year funds. Evidence of time constraints is can be explained when agencies will attempt 
to correct an older ADA violation, sufficient funds is not available, and the time has 
lapsed.    
Much like the CWC (2011) report, the GAO reports that at times,  
The lack of an adequate number of trained acquisition and contract 
oversight personnel, the use of ill-suited contracting arrangements, and the 
absence of a strategic approach for acquisition services placed DoD at risk 
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of not getting needed goods and services in a timely manner or potentially 
payment more than necessary” (GAO, 2013, p. 213).   
The GAO (2013) has also stated that the DoD’s complex and inefficient payment 
processes, non-integrated business systems, and weak internal controls impair the DoD’s 
ability to “maintain proper funds control, leaving the department at risk of over obligating 
or overspending its appropriations in violation of the ADA” (GAO, 2008, p. 2). The 
CWC (2011) report did not specifically identify discussions or inquiries of any impacts of 
fiscal law on the contingency environment.  
Gansler briefing (2010) stated that the “Defense requirements, acquisition, and 
budgeting system is not geared for this [urgent needs] environment” (Gansler briefing, 
2010, p. 5). Too many identified areas are fraudulent and wasteful. DODIG, in Appendix 
J, identified nine audits indicating nine areas of potential ADA violations , as shown in 
Appendix J and three audits related to funding and obligations problem areas. Concluding 
from the date the GAO reports and the actual date of occurrences indicate that the process 
of investigations is slow and delays exists when the reporting of ADA violations. We 
believe that the number of ADA violations in response to the GWOT will also increase as 
investigations conclude in the next four to six years. The maintenance of complete, 
consistent, and accurate contract files and accounting records is necessary to reduce the 
potential for violations of the fiscal laws and the ADA. These agencies have identified 
the complexities involved in the oversight and management of contracting and funding in 
contingency environments and the weakness in DoD business systems and internal 
controls. The USG continually make improvements continually but reported violations 
are still open. We recognize that this area is expensive and a long-term solution is 
necessary to minimize the violation of fiscal laws and management of the current fiscal 
law constraints. 
Instances have also occurred where the contracting professional has pushed back 
on the requirements generators to obtain sufficient information in order to mitigate the 
risk of violation of fiscal laws, particularly the Purpose Statute. This has resulted in 
delays and ultimate cancellation in completion of requirements, as in the example of the 
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FOB expansion. Known attempts made to funnel construction through LOGCAP, thereby 
allowing the Army to accomplish indirectly what fiscal laws prohibited it from doing 
directly. This again was not the intent of congressional appropriations. Continual SJA 
oversight and possible movement of MILCON projects to the Corps of Engineers may 
minimize some of the exposure to the LOGCAP IV contract. However, the needs 
continue to exist in the current sustainment wartime period. The LOGCAP IV program 
has adaptive changes to the PWS to incorporate small construction within the fiscal law 
constraint thresholds. Nevertheless, oversight continues to be a challenge in CONUS and 
OCONUS. 
Unlimited funding for contingencies—for example, provided through DERF and 
CERF—in the past has shown that commanders in the field have had difficulties 
accounting for the expenses in addition to conducting their missions. Current limitations 
of funding through supplement appropriations, creating delays, postponements, and 
difficulties prioritizing program requirements are constraints on contingency contracting.   
The lack of OPA funding in contingency environments and under the LOGCAP 
IV contract to support the acquisition of certain types of equipment has forced the 
contractor to lease equipment. The costs of leasing contain substantial risk premiums to 
cover the possibility of loss or damage. In the examples of Afghanistan draw down, the 
conversion of the leased equipment back to the original condition may require additional 
funding, which may or may not have been considered at the origination of the contract 
and which may result in potential violation of full funding requirements. The contracting 
officer needs to consider all life cycle costs of the item to determine funding 
requirements. The business case analysis of whether to return the altered lease equipment, 
destroy the equipment, or consider other solutions results in further administrative 
burdens on the contingency contracting offices.   
Contracting officers continue to receive funding through incremental funding 
sources, which are limited at the time of this research. The current, March 2013, 
sequestration, and DoD requirement to reduce the budget, increase the administrative 
burdens for managing contingency contracts. The Gansler report (2010) found that the 
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critical segments of the “Institutional Army” were not adapted in order to enable 
responsive acquisitions and sustainment for expeditionary operations. The contracting, 
regulations, and processes were specific areas of concern in the report that relates to our 
research of contracting in a contingency environment. One area that surprised the CWC 
was that none of the contracting officers in the field were concerned about the color of 
money but rather complained about the contracts incrementally funded. The 
administrative burden incremental funding has placed on the contracting areas and 
support staff, who must prepare and review multiple modifications to task order, 
continues. The current budget environment at the time of the writing of this project has 
revealed additional burdens on the contracting officer, including receiving a small 
amount of incremental funding insufficient to cover reasonable periods of time. This 
results in risks to both the government and the contractor of stop work or performance 
without funding.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
“Lessons from 10 years of contingency contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
led to many legislative, regulatory, and policy changes designed to improve processes 
and outcomes. However, better outcomes from these incremental improvements have in 
some cases not yet materialized, and in other cases have not been fully realized” (CWC, 
2007). We believe the same is true for constraints of fiscal law in contingency 
environments. As the DoDIG, GAO, and the Army Audit Agency continue to investigate 
further incidents, investigators will see more violations of fiscal law statutes, not as 
knowing and willful violations but as government personnel attempting to complete their 
missions with the knowledge, training, and resources they have available. We are 
recommending the improvement of communication of investigation results and extensive 
training for all contingency contracting personnel (CONUS and OCONUS) of existing 
fiscal laws.  
We recommend that Congress investigate a form of funding to support urgent 
procurements where lease-versus-buy analysis favors the purchase of equipment and 
vehicles. Implementation of O&M funding or a working capital fund for contingency 
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services could provide a funding source to cover these types of purchases to support 
Service operations. However, procurement funds are rare in service contingency 
environments, and the timing to obtain the funds is lengthy. The type of funds, Color of 
Money, is a definite constraint supporting missions in contingency environments and has 
impact to the cost of obtaining vehicles.   
Military construction in contingency environments is complex. The military’s 
development of the requirements is critical to insure that the appropriate funds obtained 
to avoid ADA violations when completing missions and building up bases. Early design 
of requirements and accurate submission so that the SJA can clearly understand the 
urgent need and recommend the correct itemization of the type of funds. Ultimately 
defining the requirements does fall back on the program to ensure that the proper funds 
are available before the funds are obligated.    
To support contingency operations, the DoD can investigate the development of a 
flexible funding model that respects DoD obligation and expenditure target needs, taking 
into consideration joint mission operations and the application and integration with all 
Services. 
As stated by the CWC (2011),  
The costs are too great and the risks are too high—both to the outcomes of 
current operations and to future contingencies—for the U.S. Government 
not to commit resources to improving the contingency-contract function. 
Because many of the high-risk issues in contingency contracting mirror 
those that have also proven problematic in the overall federal acquisition 
system, implementing real improvement to the contingency-contracting 
process could enhance the entire federal acquisition system.” (CWC, 2011, 
p. 34)   
We recommend that the government commit resources not only to improve the 
contingency-contracting process but also to include financial management. This includes 
improvements to effective and efficient management and oversight tools to reduce the 
costs and risks. The government needs to continue improvements of business system 
transparency to all key government players of costs funded and obligated. This would 
improve the inefficiencies and timely delays in the current incremental and interagency 
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funding. Improvements could also include the investigation of the creation of standards 
for approval financial management processes and regulations for all branches. These 
improvements could to ensure consistency and standardization to avoid the use of a more 
convenient regulation.   
Congress continues to attempt to make some changes with the Wartime 
Contracting Reform Act of 2012. As shown in Appendix F, the DoD is objecting to 
imposing contract limits constraints to three years in Sec. 201. This may resulting in 
continuous cycles of competitive source selections and award when resources are 
constrained, may reduce the amount of initial competition, and put additional burdens on 
contingency contracting officers to assess the need to exercise options represents the best 
decision for the government. Cost and other efficiencies may increase when resources are 
scare, particularly in contingency environments.      
C. CONTINUED RESEARCH   
We recommend research to determine whether correlations that exist between the 
constraints of purpose, amount, and time are similar in various contingency environments 
and in various phases of the contingency environment with of interviews. Because of 
limitations beyond our control, we were not able to conduct interviews within a 
reasonable amount of time to offer additional support and evidence of these and other 
cases. We encourage further research to involve interviews with subject matter experts in 
the contingency contracting field.    
We also recommend further investigation and possible legislative solutions for 
funding exceptions or broader changes in definitions, as seen under the Reres Doctrine, 
which would allow for the more extensive use of the existing O&M funding available in 
contingency environments. Definitions appear to have taken different shapes when we 
look at previous contingency environments compared to current combat contingency 
undertakings. Table 1, U.S. Forces Abroad, 1962 through 2011, as provided by the CWC 
(2011) report, shows that present operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait for the 
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GWOT are nearing or have exceeded the 13-year Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia 
operations period of 1962–1975.   
Our recommendation is to continue research on this topic to include whether 
current fiscal laws are more applicable and supportive in certain types of contingency 
environments. We have seen that in wartime environments, such as during the Balkans 
mission, a “No Color – No Year” type of funding for military construction was effective 
in meeting the mission, but the transparency and accountability of costs by commanders 
in the field was difficult to manage under the business systems available to the 
government at that time. Business System improvements continue to improve 
transparency, but the process is slow. 
Lastly, there is a need for further research of the use of incremental funding for 
cost-type contracts in contingency environments. The Gansler report research (2010) 
determined that contracting officers’ main concerns about the use of incremental funding 
and the risks imposed on both the government and the contractor can lead to mission 
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APPENDIX A.  FOUR-STEP PLANNING PROCESS (USFOR-A, 
2012) 
This information is provided in the Money As A Weapon System – Afghanistan 
(USFOR-A, 2012) as the Four-Step Planning Process. 
 
Step 1:  
• Identify the requirement. To the extent possible, you must anticipate requirements 
through deliberate planning. 
• Keep abreast of current operations to anticipate near-term needs. 
• Gather information from planning meetings to anticipate longer-term needs. 
• Review old contracts to learn when periods of performance expire—your 
Contracting Officers Representatives (CORs) are invaluable in this process. 
 
Step 2: Define the requirement. No other step has greater bearing on success than this 
step.  
• What you do here will serve as the basis for legal, funding, and contracting 
decisions in future steps.  
• Determine the five W’s (who, what, where, when, and why).  
• Your determination of the need will provide the Joint Acquisition Review Board 
(JARB) /Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB) with the information to 
approve/validate your requirement. 
 
Step 3: Prepare your spend plan. Local requirements for the spend plan may vary but will 
consist of the same general elements.  
• The spend plan is due the 15th of every month to USFOR-A Joint Headquarters 
Finance or also known as Resource Management for multiple services (referred to 
as the J8) for the following month. 
• Submit with sufficient time to allow for procurement lead-time and funding. 
• Include validated and invalidated requirements.  (See the chapter on Validation of 
Requirements.) 
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• Afghanistan is a requirements-driven theater. Funding is received from the Army 
Budget Office via the Army Central Command (ARCENT) for validated 
requirements. 
• Invalidated requirements are important for situational awareness and will be 
funded as possible once validated requirements have been met. 
 
Step 4: Prepare the requirement for either validation or funding. The following items are 
needed for the package: 
• Staff Action Cover Sheet 
• Completed funding document (See Purchase Request and Commitment (PR&C) 
or Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request( MIPR) sections to determine 
what’s required) 
• Letter of Justification (LOJ) describing the 5 “W’s” from Step 2 above 
• A SOW for services–Contact your servicing Contracting 
Office for templates 
• One Quote is required for requirements $30,000 or less. Three quotes are required 
for requirements greater than $30,000.  ≥ Internet quotes are authorized. 
• Independent Government Cost Estimate (IGCE): Required whenever items are 
not “off the shelf.”  The RCC needs this to compare against received bids 
• Appointment of Contracting Officers Representative (COR) for services and 
certain supply items that might require significant inspection and processing as 
determine by the Contracting Officer. 
• Legal Review–Obtain from your local SJA for items costing $10,000 or more. 
 
All requirements must be validated by the appropriate board: 
• JARB: Generally ≥ $200,000 for special interest items; USFOR-A Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Logistics (J4) is the theater process owner. 
• JFUB: Generally ≥ $100,000 and USFOR-A Engineers is the process owner. 
• Super Combined Acquisition Review Board (SuperCARB): ≥ $10 million; 
ARCENT is the process owner; submission is through Joint Headquarters 
Services Logistics (J4). 
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• Validation does not guarantee funds; they are requested through the Spend 
Plan process 
All funding requirements are subject to the force of U.S. law. In order to balance 
efficiency with proper oversight, USFOR-A combines a mixture of signature thresholds 
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APPENDIX B.  MONEY AS A WEAPON SYSTEM – AFGHANISTAN 
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 
The USFOR-A, updated in 2012, developed a manual to assist military and 
civilians in Afghanistan to process construction requirements. Below is the Construction 
Process. 
 
1. Installations will develop project requirements and submit to their 
applicable Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB). The JFUB evaluates and reconciles 
component requirements for real estate, the use of existing facilities, inter-service 
support, and construction/repair projects when conflicting or competing requirements 
materialize. The JFUB will review all facility requirements to include military 
construction (MILCON)-level projects. Due to approval levels, all MILCON 
requirements will be forwarded to the USFOR-A JFUB for review. MILCON 
submissions will consist of the following requirements: 
a.  ONS/ LOJ no more than 60 days old 
b.  Department of Defense Form 1391 
c.  Site Map & Location Map 
d.  Quad Chart 
e.  Legal Opinion within 60 days of the requirement from local SJA  
f.  Copy of Land Acquisition Request Form (if applicable) 
g.  Mayor letter 
h.  Explanation that requirements are for U.S. Forces only 
i.  Reference to compliance Handbook standards 
j.  Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements CC Form 35 when 
requirement supports Coalition Forces 
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2.  A submission validated by the USFOR-A JFUB that exceeds O&M 
thresholds will be forwarded to the USFOR-A MILCON Program Manager to develop 
submission package. 
 
3.  The MILCON submission package will be sent through service 
components (typically Army (or Air Force) Central Command [ARCENT or AFCENT]) 
for authorization and funding and to United States Central Command (CENTCOM) for 
concurrence and validation. In addition to the JFUB requirements identified previously, 
the submission package will include the following: 
a.  Endorsement letter signed by a General Officer including statement on 
how project adheres to strategic basing identified in Afghanistan Basing 
Strategy and other basing guidance documents. 
b.  Base Overview depicting current & projected: 
1)  Population (U.S., Coalition, Afghans) 
2)  Housing/ DFAC capacity (reflecting initial, temporary, & 
permanent facilities) 
3)  Water Storage (amount and days of supply) 
4)  Fuel Storage (amount and days of supply) 
5)  Airfield capacities 6)  Other applicable metrics 
c.  NATO Pre-Finance Statement 
 
4.  CENTCOM develops the Master Plan Priority List (MPPL) for Baseline 
MILCON and the Contingency Construction Priority List (CCPL) for Contingency 




Note: MILCON projects generally take a minimum of six–nine months (for 
reprogramming, Unspecified minor military construction [UMMC], and contingency 
construction authority [CCA]) and closer to two years (for MPPL/CCPL) prior to 
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APPENDIX C.  SUBTITLE B: MATTERS RELATING TO IRAQ, 
AFGHANISTAN, AND PAKISTAN   
National Defense Authorization Action for Fiscal Year 2013  
Passed Senate on 12/04/2012 
 (Sec. 1211)  Amends the NDAA for FY 2012 to extend through FY2013 the CERP 
(urgent humanitarian and reconstruction relief) in Afghanistan. Reduces FY2013 funding 
from $400 million to $200 million. 
(Sec. 1212)  Amends the above Act to extend through FY2013 DoD funding for 
operations and activities of the Office of Security Cooperation in Iraq and associated 
security assistance teams. Reduces funding for such FY. 
(Sec. 1213)  Amends the Skelton Act to extend through FY2013, with reduced funding, 
DoD assistance for former insurgent reintegration activities in Afghanistan. Extends 
report requirements. 
(Sec. 1214)  Amends the above Act to extend through FY2013 a program to develop and 
carry out infrastructure programs in Afghanistan that support the counterinsurgency 
campaign. Reduces FY2013 funding to $350 million. Prohibits the obligation or 
expenditure of more than 50% of such amount until the Secretary submits a plan for fund 
allocation and use. 
(Sec. 1215)  Amends the NDAA for FY 2010 to extend through FY2013 the Pakistan 
Counterinsurgency Fund for building the capabilities of Pakistan security forces. Extends 
a provision that limits the availability of amounts from the Fund to 40% until the 
Secretary reports to Congress on metrics for the use of such funds and for enhancing 
Pakistan’s efforts to counter improvised explosive devices. 
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(Sec. 1216)  Amends the NDAA for FY 2008 to extend through FY2013 DoD authority 
to reimburse certain coalition countries for logistical and military support provided in 
connection with Operation Enduring Freedom. Limits FY2013 funding. Prohibits any 
such reimbursements to Pakistan for claims covering any period when ground lines of 
supply through Pakistan to Afghanistan were closed to the transshipment of equipment 
and supplies in support of U.S. military operations. Requires a specified certification, 
from the Secretary to the defense and appropriations committees, concerning Pakistani 
cooperation with the United States prior to the obligation or expenditure of such funds for 
FY2013. Authorizes the Secretary to waive the certification requirement in the national 
security interest. 
(Sec. 1217)  Amends the NDAA for FY 2008 to extend through FY2013 DoD authority 
to provide logistical support for coalition forces supporting U.S. military operations. 
Repeals such authority for such FY with respect to Iraq (leaving only Afghanistan). 
(Sec. 1218)  Directs the Secretary to develop a strategy to support the government of 
Afghanistan in its efforts to achieve a secure presidential election in 2014. 
(Sec. 1219)  Requires the Secretary to provide for the conduct of an independent 
assessment of the strength, force structure and posture, and capabilities required to enable 
the Afghan National Security Forces to provide security for their country and to prevent 
Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists. Requires a report on 
such assessment, from the entity selected to the Secretary and the defense and 
appropriations committees. Provides funding. 
(Sec. 1220)  Directs the Secretary to report to the defense, appropriations, and foreign 
relations committees on the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program. 
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APPENDIX D.  SUBTITLE D: PROVISIONS RELATING TO 
WARTIME CONTRACTING 
National Defense Authorization Action for Fiscal Year 2013 
Passed Senate on 12/04/2012 
 (Sec. 861)  Directs the Secretary to: (1) prescribe in regulations the chain of authority 
and responsibility within DoD for policy, planning, and execution of contract support for 
overseas contingency operations; and (2) report to the defense and appropriations 
committees on such regulations. Requires the Commanding General to assess such 
regulations and report assessment results to such committees. 
(Sec. 862)  Requires the Secretary, within one year after the commencement or 
designation of a contingency operation that includes combat operations and annually 
thereafter until the end of such operation, to report to the defense and appropriations 
committees on contract support for the operation. Provides an exception. 
(Sec. 863)  Requires the DoD military readiness reporting system to measure, on an 
annual basis, the capability of operational contract support for current and anticipated 
wartime missions. Makes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff responsible for 
determining the operational contract support requirements of the Armed Forces and 
recommending appropriate resources therefore. Requires the curriculum for each phase of 
joint professional military education to include courses relating to contracting for 
contingency operations. 
(Sec. 864)  Directs the Secretary, within six months after the commencement or 
designation of an overseas contingency operation that includes or is expected to include 
combat operations, to perform a comprehensive risk assessment and develop a risk 
mitigation plan for operational and political risks associated with contractor performance 
of critical functions supporting such operation. Provides exceptions. Requires the 
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Secretary to submit the assessment and plan to the defense and appropriations 
committees. 
(Sec. 865)  Amends the NDAA for FY 2008 to extend until February 1, 2015, DoD 
reports on contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. Repeals Commanding General review of 
such reports. 
(Sec. 866)  Amends the NDAA for FY 2010 to extend through 2014 DoD temporary 
authority to acquire products and services in countries located along a major supply route 
to Afghanistan. Repeals an expired report requirement. 
(Sec. 867)  Applies, without exceptions or exemptions, Buy American requirements in 
the case of any textiles or components supplied by DoD to the Afghanistan National 
Army or the Afghanistan National Police for the production of uniforms. 
(Sec. 868)  Expresses the sense of the Senate that: (1) Latvia and other NATO member 
nations along the Northern Distribution Network routes (Network routes) are key 
economic and security partners of the United States and are to be commended for their 
contribution to ensuring that U.S. and International Security Assistance Force troops have 
reliable lines of supply to achieve their mission in Afghanistan; (2) when quality products 
at competitive prices are available, significant effort should be made to procure goods 
locally from Latvia and other NATO nations along the Network routes; and (3) Latvia 
and other NATO nations along the Network routes remain allies of the United States in 
the region, and a mutually beneficial relationship should continue to be cultivated 
between the United States and such nations. 
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APPENDIX E.  TITLE XXVIII: MILITARY CONSTRUCTION 
GENERAL PROVISIONS, SUBTITLE A: MILITARY 
CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM AND MILITARY FAMILY 
HOUSING CHANGES  
National Defense Authorization Action for Fiscal Year 2013  
Passed Senate on 12/04/2012 
(Sec. 2801)  Prohibits any reduction in scope of work for a military construction project 
from resulting in a facility or item of infrastructure that is not complete and usable or 
does not fully meet the mission requirement for the project. Directs the Secretary 
concerned to ensure project contract compliance with the ADA. 
(Sec. 2802)  Directs the Commanding General to report to the defense and appropriations 
committees on the construction or renovation of DoD facilities with in-kind payments. 
Requires annual report updates for three years. 
(Sec. 2803)  Amends the Military Construction Authorization Act (MCAA) for FY 2004 
to extend through FY2013 DoD authority to use O&M funds for construction projects 
outside the United States, which are necessary to meet urgent military operational 
requirements of a temporary nature. 
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APPENDIX F.  WARTIME CONTRACTING REFORM ACT OF 2012  
National Defense Authorization Action for Fiscal Year 2013  
Passed Senate on 12/04/2012 
The Department objects to imposing contract term limits, as proposed in Sec. 201 
that reduce contract performance periods for competitively awarded contingency 
contracts to three years. This limitation would require a continuous cycle of solicitation 
and contract award when resources are most constrained. Shorter contract periods may 
also reduce the amount of initial competition. Contracting Officers continually assess the 
need to exercise contract options to determine if continuing with an existing contractor 
represents the best decision for the government. 
Limitation of contractors to a single tier of subcontractors is not practicable for 
large contracts and may require significant additional contracting and contract 
administration capability in contingency operations where these resources are most 
scarce. It may also result in prime contractors attempting to do more work themselves, 
regardless of cost or other efficiencies, to maintain a single subcontracting tier. 
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APPENDIX G.  URGENT/RAPID PROGRAMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND FUNDS IN THE DOD 
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APPENDIX H.  FRAUD INDICATORS AND POOR PRACTICES IN RELATION TO THE 



















- The Government 
failing to state 
requirements 




are vague make it 
difficult to reasonable 
compare estimates.
- The Government 
defining statements 
of work and 
specifications to fit 
products or 




- The Government 
splitting requirements 
to use simplified 
acquisition 
procedures in order to 
avoid review and 
approval.
- The Government 
modifying the 
contract shortly after 
award in order to 
make material 
changes in the 
requirements or 
statement of work.
 - A patterns of missing 
documents or 
documentation with 
outdated information in 
the contract file.
- Contract documents 
that are altered, 
backdated, or modified to 
cover deficiencies.
- Contract awards made 
without adequate 
documentation of all pre-
award and award actions.












opportunity for fraud 
to occur.
- The contracting 
officer extending the 




experience provided a 






- The Government's 
failure to perform 
market research to 
determine evaluation 
factors, contracting 
method, or whether 
commercial items or 
nondevelopmental 
items would meet the 
Government's needs.
- The Government 
restricting 
procurement to 
exclude or hamper any 
qualified contractor.
- The Government 
revealing information 
about procurements 
to one contractor that 
is not revealed to 
another.
- The Government 






- The Government 
improperly 
disqualifying offerors.






- The Government 
and contractor 
utilizing unqualified 
personnel to develop 




contract award prices 
are consistently very 
close.
- The Government 
approves items that 
are of lesser value but 
the contract cost is 
not reduced.
- The contractor 
issuing an engineering 
change proposal 






- The Government 




are being paid to 
provide the materials 
or services.




- Contractors failing 
to meet terms but no 
compliance efforts 
are undertaken.
- The Government 




- The user frequently 
complaining of poor 
quality of supplies or 
services provided 
under a contract.  This 
may indicate that 
contractors are 
delivering something 
less that what you are 
paying for.
- The Government 
failing to appropriately 
close out the 
contracts in a timely 
- Increased workloads 
and responsibilities 
that prohibit ongoing 









oversight and physical 
inventory control.
- Unreliable property 
inventory data.
- Inventory records 
disclosure unusual 
patterns when 
compared to physical 
inventory reviews that 
cannot be reasonably 
explained.
- Inventory items 
marked with incorrect 
disposal condition 
codes, such as 
repairable or scrap 
when they should be 
labeled excellent.
- Failure to return 
Government-
furnished equipment.
- Failure to properly 
document contractor 
performance.
- The fee determining 




different from Award 
Fee Review Board 
recommendations.
- Award fee granted is 




- The contractor 
submitting false 
invoices or claims to 
the Government.
- Excess profits on 
either a specific 
contract, product line, 
or division may be a 
billing fraud indicator.
- Later contractor 
billings showing a 
downward adjustment 
in material costs as 
labor/overhead costs 
increase.
- The Government 
paying contractors 
twice for the same 
items or services 
without an attempt to 
recoup the 
overpayments.
- The Government not 
regularly reconciling 
contract payments, 
daily transactions, and 
inventory.
- Contractor's failure 
to correct known 
system deficiencies.
- Contractors or 
suppliers complaining 
that they are not being 
paid in a timely 





  manner supply or finance 
operations.
- The Government's 
failure to deobligate 
funds.
Pre-Award Award Contract Administration
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APPENDIX I.  KEY ASPECTS OF THE CONTRACTING PROCESS  
 
Taken from DoD IG Report No. D-2010–059, “Contingency Contracting:  A Framework for Reform” at http://www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy10/10–059.pdf.
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D-2010-052 x x x
D-2010-054 x x x x x
D-2010-055 x x
D-2010-064 x x x
D-2010-066 x x x
D-2010-068 x x
D-2010-073 x x x
D-2010-078 x x x x x
D-2010-081 x x x x
D-2010-085 x x
D-2010-087 x x x x
D-2010-088 x x x
D-2010-091 x x x x x
D-2011-030 x x x
D-2011-032 x x x
D-2011-036 x x x
D-2011-043 x x x x
D-2011-047 x x x x x x
D-2011-049 x x x
D-2011-061 x x x x
D-2011-066 x x
D-2011-078 x x x x
D-2011-080 x x x x
D-2011-081 x x x




D-2011-113 x x x x
DODIG-2012-023 x x
DODIG-2012-028 x x x
SPO-2010-002 x
SPO-2011-001 x x x
SPO-2011-003 x x x
SPO-2011-002 x
SPO-2011-007 x x
SPO-2011-009 x x x
Total 5 2 4 5 1 4 3 5 10 2 14 3 7 7 3 3 6 2 1 8 8 9 3
(Note to Reader:  We noticed an errors on the DODIG chart - Commercial Acquisi tion totals 3 not 2 reports, Source Selection totals 5 not 6, Potential ADA total 9 not 8.)





Taken from DODIG Report No. DODIG-2012-134 Contingency Contracting: A Framework for Reform 2012 Update, www.dodig.mil/Audit/reports/fy12/DODIG-2012-134.pdf 
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APPENDIX K.  EACH SERVICE NOW HAS AN URGENT NEEDS PROCESS 
 
Taken from Gansler briefing, Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs, briefing, 2010 
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